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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
The objective of this study is to identify the factors that enable “the right to have rights” in 
the South African political community, as well as to understand the way that community 
members perceive the meaning and value of these factors, during and following the 2008 
xenophobic attacks. In order to understand political community, I draw heavily on Hannah 
Arendt and Michael Walzer, theorists who emphasise the importance of shared values, the 
right to self-determination and the influence of relationships with outsiders and outside 
forces on the changeable nature of the political community. By focusing on shared values 
rather than quantitative demographics and statistics, this study recognises that the South 
African political community that either contributed to xenophobic rhetoric or engaged in the 
2008 xenophobic violence is neither confined to nor limited by indicators like neighborhood, 
social class or ethnicity. In order to identify the shared values of the South African political 
community and understand their meaning and value, I rely primarily on transcripts from 
interviews with citizens and migrants conducted by FMSP researchers three months after the 
2008 attacks, research reports published in the year after the attacks and semi-structured 
interviews that I conducted with citizens and migrants from September through November 
2009. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Right to Have Rights 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCING THE QUESTION 
The cover of the April 2009 issue of Forced Migration Review shows a Bihari woman with dark 
wrinkled skin crouching against a wall, head bowed. The text above the photograph reads, 
“No legal identity. Few rights. Hidden from society. Forgotten.” The theme of this issue is 
“statelessness”, and the nine words on the cover suggest that having few rights and being 
hidden from and forgotten by society are byproducts of having “no legal identity.” The 
phrasing captures the widespread assumption that a legal identity, such as citizenship or 
refugee status, guarantees direct and equal access to rights. Empirical evidence certainly 
shows that a lack of legal status prevents people from experiencing rights that are both 
fundamental, such as working and accessing the justice system, and also necessary to 
functioning in modern society, such as opening bank accounts and registering births and 
deaths. What empirical evidence does not show, however, is that the reverse is true: that the 
acquisition of a legal identity will automatically enable a person to experience rights. 
 
The assumption that legal status will enable the rights of the poor and underprivileged in 
countries that are poor and underprivileged is of concern. For one thing, the assumption – 
and the policymakers and theorists who support it – works from a top-down, state-centric 
perspective. If states are the sole arbiters of rights, and legal status confirms an individual’s 
relationship with the state, then it follows that those with legal status will experience state-
granted rights while those without it will not. The problem with such state-centric logic, 
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however, is that instead of critiquing the existing rights protection framework for its inability 
to protect the rights of certain vulnerable populations, it seeks solutions within the 
framework.  
 
The result is that the voice of the individual has been largely absent from debates about the 
meaning and value of citizenship, other forms of legal identity and the factors that enable 
them. This ground-level, citizen-centred point of view sheds light not only on the everyday 
meaning of citizenship, but on the everyday experience of being part of – or, just as 
importantly, excluded from – an “inclusive society” (Kabeer 2005: 1). This perspective is 
significant because instead of “sustaining and legitimizing” (Turton 2003: 2) the existing 
rights framework, it allows for the possibility that factors other than legal status enable rights 
and, therefore, that solutions to rightlessness may extend beyond granting legal status. 
 
Empirical studies that employ a ground-level perspective have found that there is indeed a 
twofold gap between legal status and an everyday experience of rights. First, individuals who 
already have legal status – such as citizens – do not necessarily experience the rights that they 
are entitled to. Even a cursory survey of underprivileged citizens in developing countries 
shows that those with legal citizenship do not have equal access to fair housing, water and 
other legally guaranteed social services (see Aukot 2009; Blitz 2009; Gibney 2009; Gibney 
1999; Goris et al 2009; Komai & Azukizawa 2009; Lewa 2009; Lynch & Teff 2009; Mehta 
2005; Wheeler 2005; White 2009; Williams 2005). In these cases, factors like social class, 
neighborhood location and gender play a larger role in enabling rights than legal status does. 
Second, both citizens and non-citizens may access rights through more informal channels, 
such as community-level politics or socially institutionalised bribery (see Jacobsen & Landau 
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2003; Portes 1978; Turton 2003). As Misago (2005) argues, we must recognise that, “the 
most significant responses to the protection of forced migrants” do not necessarily involve 
“officially organised domestic and international mechanisms” (2).  
 
ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTION 
The proven gap between a state-centred perspective of citizenship, in which legal status 
enables rights, and a citizen-centred perspective, in which legal status does not necessarily 
enable an everyday experience of rights, leads us to ask: what are the factors that do enable 
rights? For all we know, there may be widespread strategies and structures that vulnerable 
populations use to access rights in lieu of legal status. In August 2009, I set out to identify 
these strategies and structures – in particular, the ones that that Zimbabwean migrants used 
to access the right to protection from xenophobic violence in Johannesburg.  
 
As I conducted interviews and analysed data, however, two themes began to emerge. First, it 
turned out that Zimbabwean migrants did not engage in any sustainable strategies to protect 
themselves from xenophobic violence. Instead, vulnerable non-nationals overwhelmingly 
believed that, “the only way to solve the problems is to go back home” (Interview, 
Anonymous, 28.09.09). When it became evident that migrants were not using informal 
channels to access protection, I began to wonder whether there were factors that provided 
protection that migrants either did not control or did not know about. After all, the 
xenophobic attacks did stop, and they have not returned with the same ferocity exhibited in 
May 2008.  
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So, I interviewed South Africans, asking them why they thought that the attacks stopped and 
whether they would return. To my surprise, South African citizens identified themselves as 
the reason that the xenophobic violence ended and the reason that it would not continue. 
More specifically, a discourse was emerging around the image of a moral, mature South 
African citizen whose basic humanity both put an end to the attacks that left over 100,000 
displaced and would quell any future attacks. 
 
These two themes – the lack of migrant mobilisation and the emerging discourse of a moral, 
mature South African citizen – limited the nature of the study while suggesting new areas of 
interest. On the one hand, it became difficult to discuss the factors that enabled rights when 
migrants claimed that they would only experience rights if they left South Africa. 
Furthermore, citizens’ claims that their sense of morality enabled rights protection was at 
odds with the fact that incidents of xenophobic violence have continued throughout 2009 
and 2010. Combined with the fact that citizens initiated the attacks, it appeared that it would 
also be difficult to discuss citizens themselves as a factor that enabled protection. 
 
On the other hand, citizen and migrant reactions to the attacks steadily became more 
interesting, in light of what they suggested about political community. For example, migrants 
used linguistic strategies to avoid being targets of xenophobic violence. Considering that the 
attacks were centred on the question of who was entitled to rights, these strategies suggested 
that this type of person who had “the right to have rights” spoke a certain language. This 
idea resonated with the fact that South African citizens were also victims of the xenophobic 
attacks: one-third of the victims who died were South African (IOM 2009).  
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What is more, the type of person who had the right to have rights changed in the year 
following the xenophobic attacks, as South Africans began to profess a deep remorse and 
emphasised their morality and maturity following the attacks. This discourse actively 
excluded the corrupt cops, criminals and cabinet members who were blamed for inciting the 
violence. This new exclusion suggests a new set of shared values that characterise the South 
African political community. Of course, the meaning and significance of the discursive 
exclusion is complicated by South Africa’s place in the international spotlight as the host of 
the upcoming World Cup – a position that frequently worked itself into conversations with 
interview participants. 
 
As these themes began to emerge, I realised that I had been asking the wrong question. At 
the risk of sounding flippant, I would like to credit The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy 
(Adams 1995), a popular science fiction novel, with helping me to understand this. The 
following passage describes the reaction when a computer, called Deep Thought, announces 
that the meaning of “Life, the Universe and Everything” is “forty-two”.  
“Forty-two,” said Deep Thought, with infinite majesty and calm. 
 
“Forty-two?! Is that all you’ve got to show for seven and a half million years’ 
work?” 
 
“I checked it very thoroughly”, said the computer, “and that quite definitely 
is the answer. I think the problem, to be quite honest with you, is that you’ve 
never actually known what the question is.”1 
 
As my data results became less relevant to the question that I thought I was asking, I realised 
that I, too, had been asking the wrong question all along. Instead of asking what factors 
enabled rights, I needed to be asking what factors enabled the right to have rights.  
 
                                                
1 See http://ideas42.iq.harvard.edu for the full passage. 
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THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS 
Advocates, policymakers and theorists frequently cite Hannah Arendt’s term, “the right to 
have rights”, in arguments for human rights protection (see Gibney 1999; Gibney 2009; 
Kabeer 2005; Wheeler 2005). The two observations that are central to Arendt’s rights theory 
are, first, that humans are not inherently equal to each other and, second, that that rights 
only exist when a political community exists to protect them (Isaac 1996; Parekh 2008). 
Arendt (1951) observes that, 
Equality, in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given us, 
but is the result of human organization insofar as it is guided by the principle 
of justice. We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group 
on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights. 
(301) 
 
Unlike human rights essentialists, who believe that rights exist naturally by virtue of being 
human (see Donnelly 2003), Arendt argues that, “we are not born equal” and that equality 
“is the result of human organization”. In other words, the key to enabling the “right to have 
rights” is membership in a group of people who have made the “decision to guarantee 
[themselves] mutually equal rights”. This group of people is known as the political 
community. 
 
For Arendt, there is one fundamental component of a political community: it must recognise 
something more than “mere existence” (301) in its members by attaching meaning to their 
actions and thoughts. This distinction is the difference between being rightless and being a 
protected member of a political community. There are two other fundamental characteristics 
of political communities that concern this study, which Michael Walzer helps us understand. 
First, political communities are “communities of character” (Walzer 1983: 60), drawn 
together to practice and protect shared values. Walzer (1983) describes political communities 
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as, “historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special 
commitment to one another and some special sense of their common life” (60). Second, 
political communities have the right to self-determination. That is, they can exclude outsiders 
in order to protect the community’s shared values. Walzer (1983) explains that, “The 
distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be 
conceived as a stable feature of human life. If this distinctiveness is a value, as most 
people…seem to believe, then closure must be permitted somewhere” (39). In other words, 
acts of exclusion – of “closure” – are necessary to preserve the character of the political 
community and, as such, can be especially revealing about the nature of that character. 
 
POLITICAL COMMUNITY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
The idea that members of a political community are free to include and exclude outsiders 
based on the community’s shared values is especially compelling in the context of South 
Africa’s xenophobic violence. On May 11, 2008, the “xenophobic attacks” began in 
Alexandra, a township outside of Johannesburg. A report describes the outbreak: 
An armed mob breaks into foreigners’ shacks, evicting them and then looting 
and/or appropriating their homes. Two men are killed (1 Zimbabwean, 1 
South African) and two women are raped, one by four men. 60 people are 
injured. (IOM 2009: 24) 
 
This violence escalated dramatically and spread throughout the country over the next two 
weeks. It was not until May 25 that South African president Thabo Mbeki publicly 
condemned the violence in a national radio and television address. On May 26, Safety and 
Security Minister Charles Nqakula declared that, “the situation is under control…the 
violence has subsided” (SAPA 2008). The final statistics showed that 1,384 suspects were 
arrested, 342 shops were looted and 213 shops were burned down. At least 100,000 people 
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were displaced, 62 people were reported dead, 670 were wounded and dozens were raped. 
(BBC News 2009; CoRMSA 2008; IOM 2009; SAPA 2008) 
 
The 2008 xenophobic attacks, considered the most violent act in South Africa’s post-
apartheid history, are a hugely relevant subject both domestically and internationally – not 
least because of the country’s international position as the host of the 2010 FIFA2 World 
Cup. Many theories have been offered to explain the attacks. They range from theoretical 
explanations of “Negrophobia” and a “culture of violence” to more practical explanations 
such as poor service delivery and lagging immigration laws (see Landau 2009b: 4). However, 
these theories “falter when faced with empirical or logical interrogation” (Landau 2009b: 6). 
Furthermore, empirical research has been primarily policy-oriented and focuses on practical 
causes, reactions and recommendations. Empirical research is currently being conducted on 
the conditions that led to the attacks (FMSP 2009d), and recent reports have captured the 
humanitarian, public health and civil society response to the attacks (FMSP 2009a; FMSP 
2009b; FMSP et al 2009).  
 
This study addresses two gaps in existing literature on the 2008 xenophobic violence. First, 
literature has only minimally connected empirical research and theoretical analysis. This 
study offers a theoretically grounded, empirical examination of the attacks. It views the 
attacks as a public, widespread, violent act of exclusion by a political community and 
examines the shared values and meaning of membership that the act of exclusion was meant 
to protect. Second, existing explanations of the attacks have tended to make generalisations 
about the nature of the attacks and the people involved. This study looks at the specific 
                                                
2 International Federation of Association Football.  
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factors that enabled the right to have rights in the political community in question, as well as 
the changing nature and value of these factors. By focusing on shared values rather than 
quantitative demographics and statistics, this study recognises that the South African political 
community that either contributed to xenophobic rhetoric or engaged in the violence is 
neither confined to nor limited by indicators like neighborhood, social class or ethnicity.  
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this study is to identify the factors that enable “the right to have rights” in 
the South African political community, as well as to understand the way that community 
members perceive the meaning and value of these factors, during and following the 2008 
xenophobic attacks. In order to understand political community, I draw heavily on Hannah 
Arendt and Michael Walzer, theorists who emphasise the importance of shared values, the 
right to self-determination and the influence of relationships with outsiders and outside 
forces on the changeable nature of the political community. I recognise that a political 
community is not synonymous with a state, and that while the South African political 
community in question includes much of the underprivileged sector of society, it cannot be 
assumed to either include everyone in this demographic or exclude those in other 
demographics. In order to identify the shared values of the South African political 
community and understand their meaning and value, I rely primarily on transcripts from 
interviews with citizens and migrants conducted by FMSP researchers three months after the 
2008 attacks, research reports published in the year after the attacks, as well as semi-
structured interviews that I conducted with citizens and migrants from September through 
November 2009.  
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OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
In order to examine the factors that enable membership in the South African political 
community in question and the way that members understand these factors, this dissertation 
has been organised into four parts. Chapter One establishes the importance of a political 
community and a citizen-centred perspective in today’s context, and gives special 
consideration to challenges to the conventional study of citizenship that are emerging in light 
of the gap between legal citizens’ guaranteed and experienced rights. Chapter Two 
operationalises political community theory in the context of South Africa, discusses the 
methodology of the study and describes the interviews, limitations and ethical 
considerations. Chapter Three discusses and analyses the study findings, looking specifically 
at the shared values that were professed during the 2008 xenophobic attacks, the new 
discourse that has emerged since the attacks, which imagines the model community member 
as a moral, mature South African, and the new targets of discursive exclusion. Finally, the 
conclusion considers the dramatic change in the political community’s shared values in light 
of South Africa’s very public position as the host of the upcoming World Cup.  
 
 
 
 
 16 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Inclusion and Exclusion:  
Political Community and Legal Citizenship 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with the South African political community that supported and 
engaged in xenophobic discourse and violence, its shared values and its understanding of 
membership in the community. This chapter will lay the theoretical foundation for the rest 
of the discussion by explaining why the idea of political community is important, and why I 
am talking about political community and not citizenship. This chapter begins with a close 
reading of the “stateless”-themed issue of Forced Migration Review in order to discuss the 
weakness of citizenship: namely, that even those who are legally entitled to rights can be 
excluded from the everyday experience of those rights. After establishing the gap between 
guaranteed and realised rights among underprivileged populations, I will discuss the 
importance of a citizen-centred perspective to rights issues. Next, I will highlight some of 
the recent challenges to the study of citizenship that have been influenced by a citizen-
centred perspective. These challenges are of particular interest to this study, both because 
they resonate with the situation of underprivileged citizens in South Africa and also because 
they are consonant with features of a political community. Finally, this chapter will draw on 
Hannah Arendt and Michael Walzer to further discuss the concept of political community 
and how it fits into the emerging conceptions of citizenship. 
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THE GAP BETWEEN GUARANTEED RIGHTS AND EXPERIENCED RIGHTS 
Forced Migration Review is a well-known, reputable source that is representative of current 
issues and debates in the larger forced migration field. The journal is backed by powerful 
international players: it is published by the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of 
Oxford, and it has received funding from both the European Union and the United States 
Department of State. Contributors to the April 2009 issue have decades of experience 
working in the field and contributing to discussions on stateless issues; they range from 
UNHCR officers to human rights lawyers to academic researchers. While this issue of Forced 
Migration Review draws long overdue attention to the issue of statelessness (Blitz 2009), it also 
encapsulates a problem that is endemic throughout the larger policymaking sphere: it 
assumes that recognised legal status is the solution to statelessness simply because a lack of 
recognised legal status is the reason that people are stateless in the first place. It is worth 
noting that the term “statelessness” is synonymous with “rightlessness” in the April issue; 
accordingly, I use the two terms interchangeably throughout this section.  
 
The April 2009 issue of Forced Migration Review features articles on the theme of 
“statelessness”. Couldrey & Herson (2009), editors of Forced Migration Review, define a 
stateless person as “someone who is not recognised as a national by any state” (2). This 
includes de facto stateless people, who “lack an effective nationality” (Blitz 2009: 25) and “are 
often characterised by an inability to draw upon state protection to guarantee even their 
basic rights” (Gibney 2009: 50). As such, stateless people range from those who lack 
citizenship altogether to undocumented economic migrants to vulnerable citizens. In the 
editors’ note, Couldrey & Herson (2009) explain that because stateless people have no 
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recognised legal status, they are “unprotected by national legislation, leaving them vulnerable 
in ways that most of us never have to consider” (2).  
 
While it is undeniable that stateless people are vulnerable, it is important to draw attention to 
a problem with the logic of the editors’ note, which sets the tone for the articles to follow: 
by arguing that a lack of legal status means a lack of protection by national legislation, the 
editors are assuming that a state’s legal framework actively protects those with legal identities 
– which empirical evidence denies. The people I am speaking of are not privileged citizens in 
first-world countries, but unprivileged citizens who live on the margins of developed 
countries; in short, the very people that most of the stateless would become if offered legal 
status in their current country of inhabitation. Before we delve further into the gap between 
legal status and the everyday experience of the law, however, let us examine the “stateless”-
themed issue of Forced Migration Review in greater detail. 
 
Forced Migration Review: a close reading 
Contributors to Forced Migration Review put forth powerful arguments in favor of legal status 
for stateless people. The practical dilemma of indefinite detention for stateless deportees is 
one of the issue’s most compelling arguments for recognised legal status. Because stateless 
people “are not recognised as a national by any state”, it is near impossible to deport them. 
The result can be indefinite detention. In Bangladesh, for example, hundreds of Rohingya 
who have entered the country illegally from Burma are awaiting trial. They have been waiting 
for years, and even those who have been tried and completed their sentences remain in jail, 
because they can neither be released into Bangladesh since they have no entry paperwork, 
nor deported back to Burma, which does not recognise them as citizens. (Lewa 2009) 
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The situation is similar in Japan, whose detention facilities house many “Indochinese 
refugees” – refugees from Vietnam and Laos who fled to Thailand during the first Indochina 
War (1946-54) and are not recognised as citizens of Vietnam, Laos or Thailand. The 
detainees include children of Indochinese refugees who, legally speaking, should inherit 
Vietnamese or Laotian citizenship based on their parents’ citizenship. However, a 
combination of lost documents, separated families and a lack of birth registration means that 
entitlement to citizenship is almost impossible to prove. Because Thailand severely restricts 
the rights of these Indochinese refugees, many have been tempted to enter Japan – illegally, 
since Thailand will not grant them documentation for traveling purposes. The result is that 
the children of many Indochinese refugees have been arrested in Japan and face indefinite 
detention, as neither Thailand, Vietnam nor Laos will accept them as citizens.  (Komai & 
Azukizawa 2009).  
 
The urgency of the situation stems not only from the practical dilemma that countries like 
Bangladesh and Japan face when detaining stateless people, but also from the unilateral 
power that such countries have in deciding the fate of these individuals. In 2004, for 
example, the High Court of Australia ruled that indefinite detention for Ahmed Ali Al-
Kateb, an unsuccessful asylum applicant from Palestine, would not be unlawful (Perks and 
Clifford 2009). Considering the wide legal berth that states have regarding the fate of 
stateless migrants and the inadequacy of the international legal framework to protect 
stateless persons, the possibility of indefinite detention in any country is a very serious 
matter and presents a strong practical and ethical argument for the importance of legal 
status. 
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Another powerful argument for legal status for stateless people involves children who are 
born stateless. For the most part, states assign citizenship based on one of two principles: jus 
soli and jus sanguinis. The former evokes the “law of the soil” and grants citizenship to those 
born in a country’s territory; the latter calls on the “law of blood” to endow citizenship upon 
those born to citizens. South Africa, for example, confers citizenship primarily on the basis 
of jus sanguinis. According to the Department of Home Affairs, children with at least one 
South African parent can claim citizenship, regardless of whether or not they were born in 
South Africa (South African Citizenship Act 1995). While most countries employ a mix of 
these two principles to determine citizenship, a number of children can fall through the legal 
cracks – when their family migrates away from a jus soli country to a jus sanguinis country, for 
example, or if a child is born to a single mother in a country where citizenship is determined 
by the father’s nationality.  
 
The issue of stateless children is especially compelling because of the way that children are 
portrayed and perceived. Children and minors tend to be seen, first, as blameless for their 
stateless condition and, second, as powerless to correct it. As Lynch & Teff (2009) argue, “In 
the end, perhaps the most obvious reason why children become stateless is that they cannot 
act for themselves” (31). The perception of children as helpless victims, though not always 
accurate, is certainly a legitimate and ethically compelling reason to advocate for legal 
protection. This type of image crafting does not just stop at children; other contributors to 
Forced Migration Review argue for legal status by casting stateless adults as victims and 
appealing directly to readers’ sense of morality.  
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Consider Lewa’s (2009) rhetoric in describing Rohingyas’ migration flows: “Stateless and 
undocumented, they have no other option than relying on unsafe illegal migration channels, 
falling prey to unscrupulous smugglers and traffickers, or undertaking risky journeys on 
boats” (13). In a single sentence, Lewa manages to portray Rohingyas as victims on four 
levels. First, they are victims of the existing legal framework, which demands legal status and 
leaves stateless people with “no other option” than illegal immigration. Second, they are 
victims of society, “prey to unscrupulous smugglers and traffickers” who take advantage of 
their precarious situations. Third, they are victims of the natural world as they “undertake 
risky journeys on boats”, placing their lives at the whim of the dangerous ocean. Finally, the 
Rohingyas’ threefold victim-hood can be attributed to one source: being “stateless and 
undocumented”. This is not to say that stateless people are not victims or that their options 
are neither few nor dangerous. Rather, the point here is that the language used in some 
Forced Migration Review articles paints stateless people so thoroughly as victims that it does not 
allow readers to question their agency or image without feeling morally obligated to 
sympathise.  
 
It is not only rhetoric that makes Forced Migration Review arguments morally compelling. Some 
of the contributors themselves are stateless and offer moving and articulate insights into 
what it means to be stateless. Such firsthand accounts of discrimination and firsthand 
opinions of how to address the issue of statelessness are difficult to ignore and pose a 
powerful argument for legal status for stateless persons. Aukot (2009), for example, 
discusses the Ateker nation, which is made up of pastoral nomads and is largely removed 
from the central governments of the four bordering countries that it inhabits – Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Aukot (2009) explains that in his experience, “Were any one of 
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the governments to have a stronger presence in the Ateker region and assist in its 
development, it would make a difference” (18). Though he does not elaborate on how 
government intervention would help, it is difficult to discount his opinion because of his 
status as a stateless person; instead, his argument appears all the more valuable.  
 
Likewise, it is impossible to ignore Adam’s (2009) account of the professional difficulties he 
has faced as an ethnic minority in Kenya. He describes that, “Between 1992 and 2000, I 
applied unsuccessfully for a passport five times, losing jobs in the process. One manager 
asked me why I did not have a recognisable ethnic identity and [said] that this was why I 
could not be promoted” (2009: 19). Again, the point here is not to suggest that firsthand 
accounts of statelessness are invalid or flawed, but to draw attention to the powerful reverse 
ad hominem effect: Aukot and Adam’s arguments are made stronger because of who they are.  
 
Challenges to Forced Migration Review  
While arguments like these undeniably demonstrate that stateless people are in need of rights 
protection, they do not prove that gaining legal status will improve or even affect the way 
that people experience rights in their everyday lives. Let us return to the woman on the cover 
of Forced Migration Review. The photograph caption reads, “After confirmation of their 
citizenship, Biharis in Bangladesh can now have hope of leading a normal life after decades 
of exclusion” (2). However, it is difficult to reconcile the simple equation of legal status and 
hope for a “normal life” with the article inside on Bihari statelessness, which states that, 
“Despite recent developments in voter and ID registration, they continue to live in slum-like 
conditions, facing regular discrimination” (Hussain 2009: 30). Even this statement is more 
positive – almost misleadingly so – than the reality. While Urdu-speaking Biharis who were 
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either born after 1971 or were a minor in 1971 were granted citizenship in 2007 and entitled 
to vote in the 2008 elections (Hussain 2009), the Sindh High Court determined that Biharis 
were not eligible to vote because they did not have the necessary identification – despite the 
fact that the government was at fault for not issuing the identification (Pakistan Newswire 
2008). While obtaining citizenship after thirty-six years of indeterminate status is certainly a 
victory, it is specious to think that it elicits an immediate and direct change of social or 
political circumstance. 
 
There are two main reasons that citizenship is conflated with rights protection in Forced 
Migration Review. First, legal status has been mistakenly equated with social wellbeing. 
Stateless people tend to be among the most underprivileged groups in the world and the 
result is that, “In many parts of the world statelessness has become closely linked to the 
treatment of minorities and the right to non-discrimination” (Blitz 2009: 25). A quick glance 
at Forced Migration Review’s photo captions supports this argument. In just a few words, the 
captions manage to convey the plight of stateless people, claim that their situations are 
caused by their lack of legal status and imply that their suffering would be less if they had 
legal status.  
 
Consider the following. On page 12, a photograph of a woman and her children reads, 
“Unregistered Rohingyas in Bangladesh must fend for themselves. This mother gave birth 40 
days previously and has not been able to feed her baby properly”. Page 30 shows a dirty 
slum where children and chickens mingle amongst the trash and explains that, “The lack of 
basic services, such as toilets, washing facilities and garbage disposal and drainage systems, 
contribute to the appalling conditions faced by Biharis living in the Dhaka settlements”. 
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Finally, page 34 features a woman bent over a heavily embroidered piece of fabric and reads, 
“The Urdu-speaking community in Mirpur in Dhaka, Bangladesh, lives in poor housing 
conditions with families of 6-8 people living and working in a single room. Men and women 
work long hours – the men weaving saris at a factory and the women embroidering at 
home”.  
 
The implications are that with legal status, the Rohingya woman on page 12 could feed her 
baby and would not have to “fend for herself”, the Bihari children on page 30 would have 
access to basic social services and the Urdu-speaking woman on page 34 would not have to 
work such long hours. The reality, however, is that unless these individuals’ socio-economic 
status changed along with their legal status, their everyday experience of rights would not 
change. As Adam (2009) observes, “legal links are important for anyone belonging in 
contemporary society; however, without addressing the social acceptability of any community 
of a people, groups like the Nubians will continue to live from one crisis to another” (20, 
emphasis added). In other words, legal status is just one of many obstacles that stateless 
people must face in the struggle for equal rights. Both “social acceptability” and socio-
economic status tend to play greater roles in the experience of rights than legal identity does.  
 
The second reason that Forced Migration Review contributors seem to conflate a legal identity 
with access to rights is because they overlook the gap between formal law, which guarantees 
rights, and local practices, which can interpret and implement these laws arbitrarily. The 
following example illustrates the slippage between state laws and local implementation. The 
Citizenship Act of 2006 greatly expanded Nepali citizenship, yet some 800,000 who are 
eligible for citizenship remain stateless because of problems converting their right to legal 
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status into a reality. Even though laws have been passed that are aimed at ensuring that 
marginalised people do not fall through the cracks, there is no guarantee that the legislation 
is implemented at the community level. For example, married women need the approval of 
their husband or father-in-law to apply for a citizenship certificate, and women married to 
foreigners cannot pass their Nepali citizenship to their children (White 2009). Despite a 2005 
Supreme Court ruling that children whose mothers are Nepali and whose fathers are either 
absent or unknown must be registered as citizens, White (2009) notes that the “judgment 
was not widely circulated and some local authorities are reluctant to implement this law 
citing a lack of procedural directives…” (29). Furthermore, a citizenship certificate, once 
obtained, only “proves access” (White 2009: 28) to rights; it does not guarantee them. Thus, 
even legal citizens with legal documentation must bridge the gap between having access to 
rights and enjoying those rights.  
 
As demonstrated by Forced Migration Review articles, which are generalisable to the larger 
policymaking and theoretical sphere, arguments in favor of legal status for stateless people 
seem to be fueled by the assumption that, because the problem is that people who are not 
members of a state do not enjoy rights, the solution is to make them citizens. Yet the fact 
that legal citizens do not always enjoy the rights that they are constitutionally entitled to 
cannot be emphasised enough. For one thing, a lack of “social acceptability” and a lack of 
access to socio-economic equality mean that underprivileged people are easily marginalised, 
even if they have legal status. For another, both citizens and legal migrants can be 
overlooked or excluded from formal channels of rights protection. While a legal identity may 
indicate the right to have rights in a state, it does not necessarily elevate already vulnerable 
people to a status where they enjoy equality or consequence as members of the community.  
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A CITIZEN-CENTRED PERSPECTIVE 
Perhaps the most fundamental reason that Forced Migration Review articles conflate legal status 
with access to rights is because they are working from a state-centred perspective. From the 
state’s point of view, legal citizenship and a ground-level experience of rights are one and the 
same; therefore, it makes sense that legal status is seen as the solution to rightlessness. The 
problem with this perspective, however, is that it does not take citizens’ experiences of rights 
and citizenship into account. Kabeer (2005) explains that, 
…what is…clear is that a great deal of the theoretical debate about 
citizenship today is taking place in an ‘empirical void,’ where the views and 
perspectives of ‘ordinary’ citizens are largely absent. We do not know what 
citizenship means to people – particularly people whose status as citizens is 
either non-existent or extremely precarious – or what these meanings tell us 
about the goal of building inclusive societies. (1)  
 
As Kabeer notes, one of the major problems with the theoretical conception of citizenship 
today is that “the views and perspectives of ‘ordinary’ citizens are largely absent”, which 
means that there is a disconnect between the meaning of citizenship at the state level and the 
value of citizenship at the local level. In order to further emphasise the importance of a 
citizen-centred perspective, this section will briefly discuss the impact of a ground-level 
perspective on two of the classic debates in citizenship studies. 
 
One of the fundamental debates about the nature of citizenship and rights protection 
involves the question of whether or not governments are obligated to protect and provide 
access to social and economic rights, which are often seen as distant cousins to civil and 
political rights. Civil and political rights include political freedoms, such as speech, opinion, 
movement and religion, as well as political protections from violence and forced labor, and 
are considered the cornerstone of liberal democracies. They are also known as “first 
generation” rights, indicating their paramount position, and also “negative” rights, indicating 
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that they require inaction on the part of others. Social and economic rights, on the other 
hand, are considered “second generation” rights, or “positive” rights because they require 
action or provision of some kind from governments or other citizens, as in the case of health 
care or education.  
 
The distinction between the two types of rights became especially sharp during the Cold 
War, when the Western bloc emphasised civil and political rights and the Eastern bloc 
emphasised social and economic rights (see Donnelly 2003; Mehta 2005; Nyamu-Musembi 
2005). Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) does not distinguish 
between these two types of rights and almost all states have signed both the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, the hierarchy and categorisation of rights as positive or negative, first or 
second generation, continues to exist. 
 
However, a citizen-centred perspective recognises that citizens do not experience rights 
separately in their daily lives and argues that positive and negative rights should therefore not 
be categorised separately. As Nyamu-Musembi (2005) observes, “The reality, of course, is 
that people do not experience rights – or their deprivation – in a bifurcated manner, 
distinguishing between rights of a civil-political nature and rights of an economic-social 
nature” (42). In Burma, for example, the political freedom of movement is heavily restricted 
for Rohingyas in Burma; this directly affects their ability to seek social rights such as health 
care and education (Lewa 2009). In South Africa, the ruling in the 2000 Grootboom case 
brought social rights like housing to the forefront, “thus making the transformation of 
society become seen as a necessary condition for the efficacy of political rights” (227). 
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Donnelly (2003) further argues that rights can change from positive to negative and vice 
versa, depending on the historical and social context: 
For example, the right to food is more of a negative right in the wheat fields 
of Kansas than in Watts or East Los Angeles. Equal protection of the law is 
somewhat more positive in the South Bronx than in Stockholm. In 
Argentina, protection against torture was a very positive right indeed in the 
late 1970s. Today it is a much more negative right. (30) 
 
These examples clearly illustrate that there is a disconnect between the way that rights and 
citizenship are theoretically conceived, and the way that they are actually experienced.  
 
In response to the main liberal objection to social and economic rights, many authors argue 
that all rights require both action and inaction. Kabeer (2005) argues that in order to enjoy 
the freedom that rights are supposed to provide, people need freedom from political 
coercion as well as freedom to access material resources. Mehta (2005) adds that the neo-
liberal notion that socio-economic status should be determined by the market, and not by 
the state, is inconsequential because negative rights – such as the right to a free trial or the 
right to vote – require state resources. The ground-level experience of rights, therefore, does 
not separate or prioritise civil and political rights over social and economic rights; instead, 
they are seen as intertwined and having consequences for the other.  
 
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, a second long-standing debate has 
revolved around the question of whether rights are universally applicable to all humans, or 
whether they are particular to different cultures and states. The universalist position is 
supported by both normative and formalist arguments. On the one hand, natural law 
theorists like Immanuel Kant and contemporary theorists like Donnelly (2003) and 
Schachter (1983) argue that all humans have rights by virtue of being human and, therefore, 
 29 
that human rights are universal (see Nyamu-Musembi 2005). Article 1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which states that, “All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights” (1948), supports this essentialist position. So does the Vienna 
Declaration on Human Rights, which declares that, “all human rights derive from the dignity 
and worth inherent in the human person” (1993). On the other hand, formalists argue that 
human rights standards are universal because most states have ratified international human 
rights law, and that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is so widely recognised that 
it is customary international law, even though it is not a binding agreement (Nyamu-
Musembi 2005).  
 
The position that rights are particular to cultures and states is supported in varying degrees 
by cultural relativists. At one end of the spectrum, radical cultural relativism argues that a 
universal perspective on human rights is not possible. The American Anthropological 
Association’s (1947) response to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights captures the 
spirit of this argument, stating that, 
Standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive so 
that any attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs or moral 
codes of one culture must to that extent detract from the applicability of any 
Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as a whole (qtd Nyamu-Musembi 
2005: 35). 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, weak cultural relativism argues that a universal human 
rights discourse is possible if all cultures contribute to the existing discussion. Because it is 
important to consider all perspectives on human rights, however, existing human rights 
documents and laws are not legitimate because they originated from Western ideas about 
human dignity and social justice. 
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Cultural relativism can be seen more recently in the Bangkok Declaration of 1993, when 
Asian leaders agreed to: 
Recognize that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be 
considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international 
norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.  
 
Considering that the 1993 Bangkok Declaration preceded the 1993 Vienna Declaration on 
Human Rights, which was cited above as supporting the universalist argument, it is evident 
that this debate is significant and current. (See Nyamu-Musembi 2005) 
 
However, recent literature suggests that rights can be simultaneously universal and particular. 
Mamdani (1990) argues that rights are defined through struggle, and rights struggle is 
universal because oppression is universal: “Without the experience of sickness, there can be 
no idea of health. And without the idea of oppression, there can be no practice of resistance 
and no notion of rights” (359). Nyamu-Musembi (2005) draws on Mamdani (1990) to argue 
that rights are therefore concurrently universal and particular, since oppression and struggle 
are universally experienced, yet each struggle is unique and relative to the context. In 
response to the radical cultural relativists, who argue that universal human rights declarations 
and laws cannot exist, and weak cultural relativists, who argue that existing human rights 
documents and laws are invalid because they reflect a primarily Western conception of 
rights, Merry (1993) introduces the concept of legal vernacularisation. Legal vernacularisation 
argues that local communities appropriate Western rights discourse and thus change the 
meaning of Western terms so that they reflect local struggles. Like the debate on the primacy 
of positive or negative rights, the debate over whether rights are universal or particular is 
grounded by the practical idea that people do not experience rights and laws separately. 
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The point here has been to show that studying the way that people access rights on the 
ground changes the theoretical understanding of the way that rights are experienced. As this 
study moves towards analysing the factors that enable membership in a political community, 
it will be important keep in mind the value of a citizen-centred perspective. In the following 
section, I will discuss the impact of a citizen-centred perspective on citizenship studies and 
introduce five challenges to the conceptualisation of citizenship that have implications for 
this study.  
 
NEW WAYS OF CONCEPTUALISING CITIZENSHIP 
Not only have citizenship studies recognised the gap between guaranteed rights and 
experienced rights, they have begun to challenge the conventional understanding of 
citizenship. Generally speaking, citizenship studies tend to focus on both the legal and 
substantive relationship between citizens and the state: “Often it is stated that what is 
important about citizenship is not only that it is a legal status but that it involves practices – 
social, political, cultural and symbolic” (Isin & Nielsen 2008: 2). The very term “citizenship” 
indicates a relationship of rights and duties that is exchanged between legal members and the 
state. It is a citizen’s duty to pay taxes and vote, just as it is a citizen’s right to enjoy freedom 
of speech or protection from violence. Over the past decade, however, citizenship studies 
have begun to focus on the way that citizenship is experienced and valued by legal citizens, 
stateless persons and those in between. The gap between theory and practice has led to new 
ways of conceptualising citizenship, which suggest that neither legal status nor citizenship 
practices indicate belonging or enable rights. What follows is a list of assumptions about 
citizenship that are being challenged and a discussion about the implications for this study – 
in particular, the emerging importance of political community theory. 
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First, we cannot assume that those with equal legal status experience equal access to rights. 
This argument was heavily emphasised in the close reading of Forced Migration Review; the 
point here is to recognise that when citizens are excluded from formal politics, their actions 
have no consequence in the larger community. Wheeler’s (2005) work, which focuses on 
impoverished families in Rio de Janeiro, illustrates this point. In the constitutionally 
mandated vote for a form of government in 1993, only 66% voted for a democracy; 
interview participants who voted against a democracy explained that the form of 
government did not make a difference in their lives. Wheeler (2005) describes that,  
One poor black woman, who lives in a city housing project, said that “Brazil 
would be better off with a dictatorship. At least then things were working”. 
Another poor elderly woman from the suburbs identified “more buses” as 
the major difference in her life between dictatorship and democracy. (105) 
 
Theoretically speaking, a democratic government should at least enable a wider experience of 
political rights, but in Rio de Janeiro it only brought “more buses”. In other words, when 
people with legal status are excluded from formal channels of rights claiming, they are also 
excluded from the formal process of determining the future path of the state that gave them 
a legal identity. 
 
Second, we cannot assume that the state is the only entity that can protect and provide 
rights. Rather, both political and social rights may be obtained through informal or extra-
legal channels. In Southern Africa, refugees with legal status often receive their primary 
protection and support not from international organisations or states, but from local 
communities and other extra-legal – “although not necessarily illegal” (Misago 2005: 2) – 
sources. For example, Mozambican refugees were integrated into border communities 
despite the South African government’s attempt to confine refugees’ political and social 
integration into the country by restricting them to the “homelands” (Polzer 2007). A 1995 
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interview with a young Mozambican man working in Johannesburg documents the social, 
political and legal acceptance that refugees experienced in the homelands: 
I was welcomed at Mr. Ndlovu’s family who treated me like his son. I was 
doing everything a man was supposed to do in the family. The following year 
my family came to South Africa and stayed at Gottenburg next to Manyeleti. 
Mr. Ndlovu was selling chickens and he helped my family to get South 
African IDs, and subsequently a stand next to the new stadium. He also 
helped me to continue with my education as a result of which I completed 
my matric at Eric Nxumalo Secondary School. All these were very easy 
because of the surname Ndlovu. (qtd Polzer 2007) 
 
This account of integration into the homelands demonstrates that local families helped 
refugees find homes and employment, obtain (possibly false) legal identification and 
encouraged them to exercise the right to education.  
 
Other studies show similar findings. In the South African community of Winterveld, for 
example, Mozambican and Zimbabwean migrants participated in community politics based 
on their status as landowners; their ambiguous status as refugees, asylum seekers and 
economic migrants was overlooked. Reitzes & Bam (2000) note that South Africa’s pre-
apartheid inability to enforce immigration law enabled this community-level “political space” 
(99); after the 1994 elections, however, migrants were discouraged from participating in 
community meetings and approaching civil society organisations with grievances. These two 
cases demonstrate that it would be a mistake to overlook the informal, ground-level channels 
that those entitled to rights use to access rights.  
 
Third, we cannot assume that legal status is a necessary condition for claiming rights. Isin & 
Nielsen (2008) note that the study of citizenship usually focuses on legal status and passive 
practices of citizenship, such as voting or paying taxes. However, they argue that what 
should be studied are the non-passive acts of citizenship that occur when the actors see 
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themselves as having the right to have rights, which may not always correspond to their 
status as legal citizens.  
To investigate citizenship in a way that is irreducible to either status or 
practice, while still valuing the distinction, requires a focus on those acts 
when, regardless of status and substance, subjects constitute themselves as 
citizens or, better still, as those to whom the right to have rights is due. (Isin 
& Nielsen 2008: 2) 
 
This alternate method of studying citizenship suggests that individuals and groups that are 
not legal members of a state may see themselves as entitled to rights. As demonstrated 
above, for example, undocumented Mozambican migrants were able to participate in 
community politics, obtain legal identity documents and access social services like education 
in the “homelands” of apartheid-era South Africa. Outside of the homelands, which were 
themselves marginalised from the body politic, however, the same migrants were seen as 
illegal aliens and actively deported under the 1991 Aliens Control Act (Polzer 2007).  
 
Fourth, just as legal status is not a necessary condition for claiming rights, we cannot assume 
that legal status is the only factor that enables rights realisation. As demonstrated in the 
previous section, empirical research suggests that a citizen’s legal relationship with the state 
is not as meaningful as is generally thought, considering that citizens do not necessarily 
experience the rights that they are legally entitled to. Additionally, legal identity may not be 
the primary indicator of citizenship from a citizen-centred perspective. In Kenya, for 
example, Adam (2009) observes that ethnicity is more powerful a marker of citizenship than 
legal status is: “In Kenya nothing defines your citizenship more than your ethnicity” (19). 
For poor legal citizens in Rio de Janeiro, the most important component of citizenship is the 
feeling of dignity. Dignity is achieved through struggles for – though not necessarily 
realisation of – access to social services (Wheeler 2005). In this case, active participation – 
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the struggle for rights – can be more important in claiming citizenship than the realisation of 
formal rights. Isin & Nielsen (2008) define such “acts of citizenship” as a creative break or 
rupture in the everyday practice of citizenship: “Whereas citizenship practices like voting, 
paying taxes or learning languages appear passive and one-sided in mass democracies, acts of 
citizenship break with repetition of the same and so anticipate rejoinders from imaginary but 
not fictional adversaries” (2). In other words, citizens who are excluded from formal politics 
can enact citizenship through struggles for the rights they feel entitled to, such as education 
and adequate housing.  
 
Finally, we must recognise that new types of citizenship are emerging that do not necessarily 
involve legal status, the exchange of rights or exclusive membership. Over a decade ago, 
Sassen (1996) argued that a new type of citizenship could be conceived along 
“financescapes” (see Appadurai 1996) and observed that investors “vote with their feet” 
(40). Today, new types of citizenship include “ecological-citizen, aboriginal-citizen, market-
citizen, consumer-citizen, cosmopolitan-citizen, global-citizen, intimate-citizen, youth-citizen 
and many more” (Isin & Nielsen 2008: 1). Despite the fact that, “environments, markets, 
lifestyles and sexes are not things for which you can hold legal membership” (Isin & Nielsen 
2008: 1), individuals are increasingly claiming citizenship and rights through these multiple 
and overlapping groups. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that under a citizen-oriented 
perspective, individuals without a legal relationship to the state can still be entitled to and 
claim rights, whether it be from the state, a private body or informal channels. In other 
words, emerging citizenship studies recognise that in addition to states, where citizens hold 
legal membership, people are forming communities that transcend state boundaries in 
practicing and protecting certain shared values. 
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These challenges to the conventional study of citizenship are consonant with the 
fundamental aspects of a political community. During the following discussion of political 
community, it is important to keep in mind the following observations about citizenship, as 
influenced by a citizen-centred perspective and the empirically proven gap between 
guaranteed rights and experienced rights. First, those who have a legal identity but do not 
have everyday access to their legal rights are also excluded from formal decision-making 
processes. In other words, their actions and thoughts are not considered consequential. 
Second, the state is not the only entity that can provide access to rights; informal and extra-
legal channels may be just as – if not more – important. Third and fourth, legal status is not 
necessary to claim membership, nor is it the only factor that enables belonging. Instead, 
factors like ethnicity may be more effective enablers of the right to have rights. Finally, new 
types of communities are emerging around shared values, not necessarily the exchange of 
rights. Now, let us turn to Arendt, Walzer and political community. 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY: ARENDT AND WALZER 
Hannah Arendt’s conception of the political community was largely influenced by the 
experience of World War II refugees, who found that they had no basis upon which to claim 
rights once they were territorially displaced and literally stateless. The context has certainly 
changed since Arendt’s time: rather than stateless Europeans fleeing international war and 
oppressive regimes, today’s displaced people are primarily victims of civil war, poverty and 
development; may be internally displaced; and tend to come from Southern countries 
(Barnett 2002; Castles & Miller 2003; Gibney 1999; Martin 2001). Perhaps the biggest change 
has been the emergence of a permanent, international refugee regime, mandated to protect 
the rights of the stateless. Yet the new regime has not tackled the fundamental issue of state 
 37 
sovereignty (Barnett 2002; see Isaac 1996), and the tension between human rights protection 
and sovereignty that colored Arendt’s time still remains (see Toole & Waldman 1997).  
 
Arendt’s central argument is that a political community is necessary to guarantee rights, 
because naturally occurring human rights do not exist. Reflecting on World War II, she 
writes,  
We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means 
to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) 
and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when 
millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights 
because of the new global political situation. (1951: 296-7) 
 
Arendt’s main concern here is the “right to have rights”, which is secured by membership in 
a community that recognises each others’ actions and thoughts as meaningful. It is 
significant that Arendt does not identify this community as a state; instead, she argues that all 
humans have the “right to belong to some kind of organized community”. This community 
is essential to ensuring that people are not made to exist simply as human beings without 
rights, and it must be “willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever” (Arendt 1951: 
297). The idea that the political community can guarantee rights resonates with the emerging 
recognition in citizenship studies that the state is not the only entity that can provide and 
protect rights.  
 
The most important aspect of Arendt’s political community is that its members attach 
meaning and significance to each other’s actions and thoughts. For Arendt, this is the key 
distinction between being rightless and enjoying the right to have rights. In order to 
distinguish between freedom, which any rightless person may have, and consequence, which 
only community members enjoy, Arendt (1951) employs the following example: 
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If a Negro in a white community is considered a Negro and nothing else, he 
loses along with his right to equality that freedom of action which is 
specifically human; all his deeds are now explained as ‘necessary’ 
consequences of some ‘Negro’ qualities; he has become some specimen of an 
animal species, called man. Much the same thing happens to those who have 
lost all distinctive political qualities and have become human beings and 
nothing else. (301) 
 
In this example, the “Negro” is excluded from the political community because he is not 
recognised as anything more than a Negro. The political community – in this case, the white 
community – does not recognise his acts as meaningful; they are simply a “necessary 
consequence of some ‘Negro’ qualities”. One of the fundamental aspects of a political 
community, then, is that members guarantee each other’s equality by recognising 
consequence in each other’s actions and thoughts. This idea resonates with the emerging 
recognition in citizenship studies that those who occupy the gap between having legal status 
and not having rights are excluded from formal avenues of decision-making; in other words, 
their actions and opinions are not recognised as consequential within the state.  
 
In a lecture in 1955, Arendt advocates for the right to “citizenship” that is internationally 
guaranteed. At first glance, this seems very similar to citizenship in a state that grants rights. 
Speaking about the potential for rightlessness that is inherent in the existing state-based 
framework of rights protections and guarantees, Arendt (1955) argues,  
If we do not stop this by having – not a bill with innumerable human rights 
which only the highest civilizations enjoy – but one internationally 
guaranteed right to Citizenship – whatever this citizenship may happen to be 
–, we shall have more and more people who with respect to their legal status 
no longer are human, who have no longer a place within humanity. (5) 
 
Although Arendt uses the term “citizenship”, she makes it clear that she is using the term 
vaguely when she says, “whatever this citizenship may happen to be”. Furthermore, she 
distinguishes between states that grant rights, or “the highest civilizations”, and a larger, 
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vaguer community. In other words, Arendt was advocating for membership in a new form 
of a political community – not the existing form of a state.  
 
It is also important to recognise the fact that Arendt was heavily influenced by the inherent 
tension between rights and sovereignty that became apparent in the wake of World War II. 
She observes that, 
The Rights of Man…had been defined as ‘inalienable’ because they were 
supposed to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the 
moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back 
upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no 
institution was willing to guarantee them. (Arendt 1951: 292) 
 
For Arendt, the problem of rightlessness stemmed directly from the fact that states were the 
only entity able to protect rights in World War II. She argues that, “Only with a completely 
organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with 
expulsion from humanity altogether” (1951: 297). Arendt is careful not to place rights 
safeguards in the hands of states, and it is highly doubtful that she would condone human 
rights or immigration policies that identified citizenship as the solution to statelessness.  
 
The difference between membership in a political community and citizenship in a state may 
seem negligible, considering the reality that wherever a person lives, they are on the territory 
of a nation state, and nation states only grant full rights to citizens. In this real-world 
situation, Gibney (2009) is justified in arguing that, “The primary injustice the stateless 
experience…is not that they cannot find a state to grant them citizenship but that the state 
which should grant them citizenship will, for various reasons, not do so” (50). In other 
words, the “primary injustice” that those without legal status experience is that states 
exercise the right to exclude them. What is missing from this discussion, however, is the 
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individual’s right to be actively included in a community. This is what Arendt means when 
she speaks of the difference between mere existence, which a rightless person suffers, and 
having meaningful thoughts and actions, which members in a political community enjoy. In 
order to better understand the subtle distinction between citizenship, which has been proven 
to exclude and ignore certain pockets of citizens, and political community, which emphasises 
shared values and mutual guarantees of equality, let us briefly consider the debate between 
universalists – represented by Joseph Carens – and communitarians – represented by 
Michael Walzer. 
 
Universalists stress the importance of the individual over the community and, to varying 
degrees, believe in the right to free movement and open borders. These arguments tend to 
be centred on the theme of exclusion – that is, why migrants should not be excluded from 
foreign territories or communities, rather than why they should be included. In an argument 
for open borders, Carens (1987) asks, “On what moral grounds can these sorts of people 
[immigrants] be kept out? What gives anyone the right to point guns at them?” (251, italics in 
original). In answering these questions, Carens (1987) refutes Nozick’s (1974) argument that 
property rights justify a state’s right to exclude immigrants, by claiming that this theory 
“provides no basis for the state to exclude aliens and no basis for individuals to exclude aliens 
that could not be used to exclude citizens as well” (253, emphasis added). Based on the type 
of questions that Carens poses, as well as the logic of his argument, it is clear that his 
primary concern is to prove that states have little, if any, justification for excluding those 
who want to come in.  
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For Carens, the right to freely enter a community is separate from the right to membership 
in that community. He notes that while open borders are “a goal toward which we should 
strive” (1987: 270), there is still a distinction between members and non-members.  
To say that membership is open to all who wish to join is not to say that 
there is no distinction between members and nonmembers. Those who 
choose to cooperate together in the state have special rights and obligations 
not shared by noncitizens. (Carens 1987: 270) 
 
As he notes above, members “have special rights and obligations not shared by noncitizens”. 
Though Carens (1987) offers that, “If people want to sign the social contract, they should be 
permitted to do so” (270), it is clear that political belonging is only a possible, but not 
necessary, component of open borders. It is significant that Carens acknowledges a 
separation between freedom of entry and political membership, because this is precisely the 
distinction that concerns Arendt. If those who are free to enter are not given meaningful 
membership in the community, then they are “beyond the pale of the law” (Arendt 1951: 
288) and simply exist within the geographical borders of the state.  
 
Unlike Carens, Walzer (1983) links the right to entry with the right to political belonging. For 
Walzer, a community’s right to self-determination means that territorial entry and political 
membership are essentially one and the same. He explains that, “One might insist, as I shall 
ultimately do, that the same standards apply to naturalization as to immigration, that every 
immigrant and every resident is a citizen, too – or, at least, a potential citizen. That is why 
territorial admission is so serious a matter” (1983: 52). In other words, a community’s right 
to exclude immigrants is justified by the fact that there is no gray area between territorial 
inclusion and political inclusion. Although Walzer argues this point by using the example of 
guest workers who, according to Hobbes (1988), must give consent in order to be ruled 
over, he extends this argument to “every new immigrant, every refugee taken in, every 
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resident and worker” (1983: 62). Once an immigrant enters a territory, then, political 
inclusion must follow. The idea that a community has the right to self-determination in 
order to protect its shared values resonates with the emerging recognition in citizenship 
studies that shared values may be more important to claiming membership than legal status. 
 
Walzer’s communitarian position is based in the belief that the community comes before the 
individual. Communities are created around certain shared values, and they enjoy the right to 
self-determination in order to practice and protect those shared values. This means that 
inclusion depends on the existing members’ “understanding of what membership means in 
our community and of what sort of community we want to have” (Walzer 1983: 32). This 
suggests that membership can change and criteria for membership can change. Walzer 
(1983) continues: 
But we don’t distribute it among ourselves; it is already ours. We give it out 
to strangers. Hence the choice is also governed by our relationships with 
strangers – not only by our understanding of those relationships but also by 
the actual contacts, connections, alliances we have established and the effects 
we have had beyond our borders. (32) 
 
More importantly, Walzer attaches meaning to the way that members understand and value 
membership in their community, relationships with outsiders and the actual experiences and 
effects that a community has beyond its borders. In other words, members’ subjective 
understanding of the political community directly influences the present and future 
admissions policies.  
 
The primary difference between citizenship and political community, as made clear by the 
above debate, is that members in a political community are included the self-determination 
of that community, meaning that their actions and thoughts have consequence within the 
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community. It is important to note that this section has compared empirical studies of 
citizenship with the theoretical concept of political community. However, empirical studies 
of citizenship have begun to challenge conventional citizenship theory and suggest a new 
conception of citizenship – which resonates with Arendt’s and Walzer’s conception of 
political community. Thus, it is highly apposite to discuss the theoretical aspects of political 
community.  
 
What is more, an evaluation of Arendt’s rights theory in today’s context is particularly 
significant because her work has become what Kohn (2007) calls “increasingly provocative” 
(xiv). Academics and activists frequently cite Arendt’s argument for “the right to have 
rights” in their advocacy for equal rights and explanations of the dimensions behind rights 
protection (see Gibney 1999, 2009; Goris et al. 2009; Kabeer 2005; Parekh 2008; Tsao 2004; 
Wheeler 2005). Yet these citations are worrisome, because they mistakenly interpret Arendt’s 
political community as the state, and membership in the political community as citizenship in 
the state. 
 
In the introduction to a collection of essays on the theme of “inclusive citizenship”, for 
example, Kabeer (2005) conflates the “right to have rights” with the right to “full” 
citizenship. She writes, “The search for recognition by such [vulnerable] groups often first 
takes the form of demand for what Hannah Arendt called the ‘right to have rights’, to be 
recognized as full persons, despite their difference, and hence as full citizens” (2005: 4, emphasis 
added). Kabeer correctly identifies the “right to have rights” as the right to be recognised as 
a “full person” – or, as Arendt (1951) would say, the right to “a place in the world which 
makes opinions significant and actions effective” (296-7). This place in the world is 
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membership in a political community. The problem with Kabeer’s interpretation is that she 
continues by conflating a “full person” with a “full citizen”, thus assuming that a political 
community is a state and membership in the political community is citizenship. 
 
Considering the increasing acknowledgement among academics, aid workers and 
policymakers that states determine the quality, extent and type of human rights protection 
(see Barnett 2002; Gibney 1999; Helton 2000; Parekh 2008; Zetter 1991), it is not surprising 
that recent citations of Arendt have equated the right to a political community with the right 
to citizenship. When even a powerful international body like the UNHCR is considered “a 
creature of the state alone” (Barnett 2002: 260), it is difficult to imagine a type of political 
community that both protects rights and exists outside of the nation-state framework. 
Furthermore, there is a tension within forced migration studies between producing work that 
is both academically sophisticated and politically relevant (Jacobsen & Landau 2003; Turton 
1996). However, these interpretations of Arendt are problematic because they assume that 
legal status enables rights, while empirical evidence shows that legal status does not enable 
rights. This leads policymakers and academics to cite Arendt in arguments for a faulty 
solution that her work does not even condone.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter began by demonstrating that there is an empirically proven gap between legally 
guaranteed rights and actual, experienced rights. The citizens who fall into this gap tend to 
inhabit underprivileged sectors of society in underprivileged states. This gap has not gone 
unnoticed by those who study citizenship, and new ways of conceptualising citizenship have 
emerged, which do not necessarily rely on legal status or the exchange of rights. These 
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emerging ideas of citizenship resonate both with the theory of political community, as well 
as the situation leading up to the 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Having 
established the importance and relevance of the political community, we will now turn to the 
South African political community and its public and violent act of exclusion during the 
xenophobic attacks. In the next chapter, we will discuss the South African context and how 
to operationalise and measure political community. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Measuring Political Community: 
Operationalising Theory in South Africa 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to continue the discussion of political community in the 
context of the 2008 South African xenophobic attacks. The goals are to operationalise the 
theory of political community and establish a method for measuring it in the South African 
context. The chapter will begin with a brief background on the xenophobic violence and its 
relationship to the South African political community. Next, I will consider the fundamental 
aspects of a political community as established by Arendt and Walzer and work to 
operationalise these characteristics. One of the factors necessary to a political community is 
members’ ability to guarantee each other mutually equal rights; in view of this factor, I will 
consider the importance of a citizen-centred approach to measuring political community. I 
will then discuss the research design and, finally, the interviews themselves as well as the 
limitations and ethical considerations of the study.  
 
2008 XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Xenophobic violence is not new to post-apartheid South Africa. Major xenophobic incidents 
were documented in Gauteng province in 1994, 1998 and 2000. Starting in 2005, the 
frequency of xenophobic incidents increased and spread from Gauteng to the Free State and 
Western Cape. The four violent xenophobic incidents in 2007, mainly aimed at foreign shop 
owners, took place in the Eastern Cape, North West, Mpumalanga and Gauteng. From 
January 2008 through April 2008, there were ten xenophobic incidents, aimed at foreign 
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shops and homes and frequently resulting in displacement, in all of the provinces listed 
above with the addition of Kwa-Zulu Natal. (CoRMSA 2008; IOM 2009) 
 
In May 2008, a spate of xenophobic attacks echoed across South Africa. Spreading from 
Alexandra to Cape Town over the next two weeks, the attacks resulted in over 100,000 
people who were displaced, an estimated 30,000 who fled to neighboring countries, 62 
people killed, dozens raped and millions of rand destroyed as property and belongings were 
looted and damaged (CoRMSA 2008; IOM 2009). The South African Defense Force was 
eventually brought in to stop the violence, but not before irreparable damage had been done 
to individuals, communities and South Africa’s reputation as the host of the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup. At the heart of the attacks was the question of who – that is, what kind of 
person – was entitled to rights and resources in South Africa.  
 
This is a question that has shaped South Africa’s history of exclusion. The national project 
of bringing all South Africans together at the end of apartheid meant that the government 
had to unify “a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and 
injustice” (Tutu 1998). Because South Africans shared neither a cultural, ethnic nor national 
identity, “the ‘imagined community’ of the new South Africa focuses on citizenship; the 
participation of all citizens, regardless of difference, in the rights and obligations of 
citizenship, is a unifying force” (Peberdy 2001: 28). In other words, legal citizens are the 
primary beneficiaries of state-allocated rights, and this distinction is used to define who 
belongs to the South African nation-state and who does not. 
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It is significant that Peberdy (2001) emphasises the “participation” of citizens as a unifying 
force, rather than actual realisation of rights. After all, it is common knowledge that, citizens 
or not, South Africans – and particularly poor ones – do not receive the rights that the 
Constitution guarantees them. The meaning of citizenship, then, is not necessarily that legal 
citizens enjoy certain rights and privileges that non-citizens do not; it is that legal citizens can 
access rights and have obligations, while non-citizens cannot and do not. Murray (2003) 
explains that because the question of legitimate membership has plagued South Africa’s 
history, citizenship in the post-apartheid era has become “a symbolic marker of affiliation 
with the body politic and a crucial source of ‘rights chauvinism’” (449). In other words, since 
the 1994 election, in which all South African citizens were entitled to vote, citizenship has 
come to be more of a symbol of belonging than an enabler of rights. 
 
Citizenship has proven to be a weak symbol of belonging, as numbers of South Africans 
have found themselves without the rights and resources that the state provides. The result is 
that citizens have been more successful in demonstrating their national belonging through 
excluding foreign nationals than in claiming legal rights. By casting the non-citizen as an 
outsider, state and citizen fears have easily come to centre on black Africans. 
Now that all South Africans are members of the nation, entitled to all the 
benefits that accrue to citizens, South Africa’s immigration anxieties focus on 
all those nonnationals who could become members of the nation, and claim 
access to state resources. Black Africans have thus become the focus of the 
new state’s fears. (Peberdy 2001: 30) 
 
Indeed, de facto post-apartheid South African national identity has been primarily based on 
excluding black African migrants and all that they symbolise. For example, Reitzes & Bam 
(2000) found that before 1994, immigrants were integrated into civil society and participated 
in community decision-making in the Winterveld community. After the 1994 election, 
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however, citizens viewed immigrants as “immigrants” and not community members, which 
led to their exclusion from the community and national identity.  
 
There are some features of post-apartheid belonging that resonate with the previous 
discussion on political community and citizenship. First, there is a shared value present: legal 
identity. As demonstrated, citizenship has become a symbol of belonging; its value lies not in 
its use for claiming rights, but for signifying membership in an exclusive community. There 
are also shared resources, which citizens – or members – are entitled to. In order to protect 
these resources, the political community – particularly the subset of South Africans who 
were most forcefully excluded from the community prior to apartheid; that is, poor black 
South Africans – is engaging in exclusionary practices. These practices include imagining that 
there are only enough resources for South Africans and that migrants are illegally gaining 
access them and depleting the finite supply. These exclusionary practices are common 
throughout South African society. As Landau (2009b) observes, “What separates non-
nationals is the degree to which exclusion is both bureaucratically institutionalized and 
socially legitimate” (13). With this background, we can read the 2008 xenophobic attacks as a 
public, violent, widespread act of exclusion that included not just those who engaged in the 
attacks, but also those who supported it through their discourse. 
 
MEASURING POLITICAL COMMUNITY 
Let us now operationalise the definition of political community in the South African context. 
In the previous chapter, we identified four fundamental features of the political community:  
 
(1) The political community guarantees its members equal rights 
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In order to operationalise the definition of a political community, it is necessary to reconcile 
theory with real-world circumstance. In an ideal – or theoretical – world, we make decisions 
about membership, resource distribution and such under a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls qtd in 
Carens 1987: 255). That is, we make moral decisions about who should be entitled to certain 
rights without considering the existing power relations and institutional structures. In an 
ideal world, a “political community” can guarantee rights to its members. But this is not an 
ideal world; instead, we are concerned “with what existing agents ought to do here and now, 
and normative prescriptions cannot be formulated independently of the character of the 
agents we are aiming to direct” (Gibney 1999: 175). In the existing nonideal world, rights are 
granted through legal structures, and the state is the only entity that can provide legal access 
to legal rights.  
 
Considering the above, we can speak of South Africa’s political community as a rights-
granting community by recognising two boundaries. First, we are looking specifically at the 
underprivileged sector that actively excluded outsiders through xenophobic discourse and 
xenophobic violence. There were certainly pockets of underprivileged communities that did 
not engage in the xenophobic attacks of 2008, but it is universally recognised that the 
underprivileged South African community engages in – and has even propagated for political 
gain – the xenophobic idea that outsiders are gaining illegal access to resources that rightfully 
belong to South African citizens. Second, this underprivileged South African community is 
made up of legal citizens who have rights guaranteed by the state. The acts of exclusion that 
they engage in have the purpose of protecting the rights that they imagine themselves to 
have – and, thus, the act of exclusion can be thought of as an act of protection of rights, and 
therefore, a guarantee that there will be more rights to go around.  
 51 
(2) Members recognise each other’s actions and speech as meaningful 
Arendt’s political community is determined by its members’ willingness to recognise equality 
and consequence in each other. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to determine 
whether a political community exists by measuring the political subjectivities of vast 
numbers of individuals and mapping overlapping subjectivities. Instead, we will focus on the 
practice of recognising “meaningful” action and speech in each other by working from a 
citizen-centred perspective. As previously noted, Arendt uses the example of a “Negro” in a 
white community to demonstrate that when his actions are not considered meaningful, then 
the white community sees them simply as a “necessary consequence” of his Negro-ness. 
This example is useful in the context of South Africa, which tends to stereotype non-
nationals and attribute characteristics like high rates of crime and poor education to the 
simple fact of being “Zimbabwean” or “Nigerian”.  
 
(3) The community is characterised by shared values 
There are three functional features of shared values that have implications for this study. 
First, the whole community does not need to engage in an act in order for them to share 
values with the actors. In other words, the political community that committed the act of 
exclusion is not limited to the people who were acting; it also includes the people who 
shared the values being made public. That being said, it is important to note that political 
communities can be overlapping. This means that people can be part of the de facto 
disenfranchised South African community, but that does not mean that they are 
automatically considered part of the political community that excluded migrants. Finally, the 
values that a political community centres around can change. This means that political 
communities themselves can change. Factors that may affect change include new subjective 
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understandings of the value of membership, experiences with outsiders and events outside 
the community. 
 
(4) The community has the right to self-determination through the exclusion of 
outsiders 
It is important to recognise that the right to protect shared values through exclusion does 
not justify the violence that took place in 2008. Theorists like Arendt and Walzer would 
certainly not condone the violent determination of a community. However, by recognising 
that this is a legitimate right, we can more easily see the 2008 attacks as a massive act of 
exclusion that sheds light on the political community at the time of exclusion. 
 
ANSWERING THE QUESTION & COLLECTING DATA 
The object of this study is to identify the shared values that make up the South African 
political community and understand the value and meaning that members attach to them. 
Working from a communitarian standpoint, we accept that the community has the right to 
self-determination and that the act of exclusion has significant implications for “the 
decisions they [a political community] make in the present about their present and future 
populations” (Walzer 1983: 31). The 2008 xenophobic attacks were a massive act of 
exclusion, and it is against this backdrop that we ask who was excluded and what this 
signifies about the South African political community, both in the present as well as the 
future. In order to answer the question, we need three types of information. 
 
First, it is necessary to identify the factors that enabled the right to have rights prior to the 
xenophobic attacks. While I agree with Walzer (1983) that the concern is “not with the 
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historical origins” (31) of the political community, but with the way that acts of exclusion 
shape its membership, it is also important not to assume that the South African political 
community was static before the 2008 xenophobic attacks. Considering the history of 
apartheid and the movement towards a “rainbow nation”, it is very possible that the 
xenophobic attacks were actually a reaction, or a rejection, of an earlier form of political 
community. Thus, it is important to investigate the discourse around membership in the 
South African political community prior to the xenophobic attacks.  
 
Phase One 
This first stage of research was desktop research, studying the period from 1991 to 2008. It 
also included quantitative analysis of the African Cities Survey from 2006, which captures 
relationships between non-national migrants, South African citizens and social and 
governmental structures in inner city Johannesburg. Key information includes: 
(1) How was the provision of rights understood in the political community? 
• How did members understand and value rights provision? 
• How did non-members understand and value rights provision? 
(2) Did the political community engage in acts of exclusion, either through discourse or 
actions? 
• Who participated? 
• Who was excluded and how? 
• Was any group of people denied meaningful actions and speech?  
• What does this say about the community’s shared values? 
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Phase Two 
Second, it is important to understand the nature of the 2008 xenophobic attacks, particularly 
as an act of exclusion. This information sheds light on the way that members understand 
membership in the political community, as well as the way non-members understand it. Key 
information includes: 
(1) What were the quantitative descriptors of the attacks? For example: 
• Who was attacked and who did the attacking?  
• Who was excluded through the attacks?  
• What does this tell us about the shared values of the South African political 
community? 
(2) What was the discourse that explained the attacks in the immediate aftermath? For 
example:  
• What were the reasons that political community members gave for the 
attacks?  
• What were the reasons that outsiders to the political community gave for the 
attacks? 
• What does this say about members’ and non-members’ subjective 
understanding of the political community and value of membership? 
(3) What actions were taken against the attacks? For example:  
• Did members and/or non-members engage in strategies to protect 
themselves from the attacks?  
• What were these strategies, and how did the users understand them?  
• What does this tell us about the makeup of the “political community” that 
engaged in and supported the attacks? 
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This second phase of research was conducted primarily by going over quantitative and 
qualitative data that had been collected in the immediate aftermath of the xenophobic 
attacks. In the quantitative analysis, I relied primarily on the FMSP Vulnerability Pilot 
Survey, conducted in February 2009, which identifies and compares vulnerability levels 
among migrants and non-migrants in Alexandra and inner city Johannesburg following the 
xenophobic attacks. The survey interviewed 2,028 respondents, was stratified to reflect a 
comparable amount of citizens and non-citizens, is heavily representative of Zimbabwean 
migrants and includes undocumented migrants.  
 
For the qualitative analysis, I relied primarily on four sources: 
(1) The 200+ transcripts conducted in the fall of 2008 by FMSP for the 
Vulnerability Pilot Survey  
(2) The 2009 IOM report which documented the causes of the 2008 violence, titled 
“Towards Tolerance, Law, and Dignity: Addressing Violence against Foreign 
Nationals in South Africa” 
(3) The 2008 CoRMSA report which also documented the causes of the 2008 
violence, titled “Protecting Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Immigrants in South 
Africa” 
(4) Interviews by FMSP faculty members Tara Polzer and Aurelia Wa Kabwe-Segatti 
on grassroots migrant organisations created in the wake of the 2008 attacks 
 
Phase Three 
Finally, it is important to know what the political community looks like one and a half years 
after the massive, violent, and public exclusion. This perspective allows us to reevaluate the 
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political community’s shared values and targets of exclusion, and also determine whether the 
community’s admissions policies have changed and whether members’ and non-members’ 
understanding of the meaning and value of membership in the political community have 
changed. Key information includes: 
(1) How do members and non-members make sense of the 2008 violence? 
• What do members and non-members identify as the root causes of the 
attacks? 
• What do they identify as the reason that the attacks stopped? 
• What does this say about the political community’s perception of its shared 
values during the attacks? 
(2) How do members and non-members make sense of the period between 2008-2009?  
• How do members and non-members think that other South Africans reacted 
to the attacks? 
• How do members and non-members think that the international community 
reacted to the attacks? 
• What does this say about the political community’s relationship and 
experiences with the outside community? 
• Do members and non-members think that the violence will return? 
• Do members and non-members think that xenophobia aimed at other 
groups will return? 
• What does this say about the shared values of the political community? 
• What does this say about whether the shared values have changed? 
(3) How do members and non-members understand the provision of rights the political 
community? 
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• Who do members and non-members see as entitled to rights? 
• What are the main challenges in providing rights? 
• What are the main challenges in accessing rights? 
• How do members understand and value rights provision? 
• How do non-members understand and value rights provision? 
(3) Does the political community continue to engage in acts of exclusion, either through 
discourse or actions? 
• Who participates? 
• Who is excluded and how? 
• Is any group of people denied meaningful actions and speech?  
• What does this say about the community’s shared values? 
 
For the third phase of research, I conducted thirty-one semi-structured interviews with both 
migrants and citizens. By using mixed methods, I was able to identify trends captured in 
existing quantitative data and develop my qualitative instrument based on gaps and 
suggestions in the existing data (see Greene et al 1989; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004; 
Johnson & Turner 2003; Madey 1982; Sieber 1973). As Banister et al (1994) explain, 
qualitative research is “the voice that carries through the sense of the phenomena under 
investigation, while the quantitative research component circumscribes the scope and intent 
of the topic” (15). After identifying the “scope and intent”, it was important to “have the 
respondents construct for the researcher the relevant categories of experience” (Calavita & 
Seron 1992: 768). The interviews were the most important part of the research project, as 
they shed light on how members and non-members made sense of the political community, 
its shared values and its acts of exclusion. 
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The interview sampling frame and stratification follows: 
 
(1) Respondents must have a relationship to the political community in question. That 
means that they must either be part of the community, have actively chosen to not 
be a part of it or be excluded by it. As discussed earlier, this study generally considers 
the South African political community in question to be the underprivileged sector 
of society that was previously excluded from the national identity under apartheid, 
gained legal citizenship post-apartheid, but does not have an equal experience of 
everyday rights. Within this stratum of the South African population, the members 
of the political community under examination either supported the xenophobic 
rhetoric or engaged in the xenophobic violence of 2008. 
 
(2) In order to fully understand the meaning and value behind membership in the 
political community, those who engaged in the xenophobic attacks and those who 
were targeted by the attacks must be interviewed. This study looks at South African 
citizens – both those who were involved in or supported the attacks, and those who 
did not – as well as Zimbabwean migrants who were targeted by the attacks. 
Zimbabwean migrants were chosen because they were the main targets of the 
xenophobic violence.  
 
(3) Considering that this study works from a communitarian understanding of political 
community, which places the community before the individuals, the community 
must be the unit of analysis. Individuals were interviewed, but each participant’s 
understanding of the meaning and value of membership will contribute to the overall 
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understanding of the South African the political community. In order to get a sense 
of community dynamics, group interviews of two to three participants will be 
implemented. 
 
INTERVIEWS: DESCRIPTIONS, OBSERVATIONS AND CHALLENGES 
The interview site 
Interviews were conducted at the Methodist Church in downtown Johannesburg, located at 
the intersection of Pritchard Street and Small Street. The Methodist Church is a well-known, 
publicly contested space, called “a horror” and “a ticking time bomb” by lawmakers (Dixon 
2010). It provides housing and other social services to approximately 3,500 people, most of 
whom are Zimbabwean. Referring to the overcrowded, squalid nature of the Church, 
Molebatsi Bopape from the Health and Social Development Committee stated in October 
2009 that, “If I could have it my way, I would close it down today” (Dixon 2010). 
Neighborhood shopkeepers also complain about the presence of thousands of migrants 
“loitering” during the day; those who stay at the Church vacate the building during the day, 
often moving through the city looking for “piece work”. While the Church is undeniably an 
unsustainable, unsanitary solution to the numbers of migrants – both internal and external – 
who come to the city looking for work and a better life, there is simply no other alternative.  
 
In addition to the Methodist Church, which I gained access to as a researcher for FMSP’s 
Migrant Mobilisation report (2009c), I tried to conduct interviews in townships that had been 
sites of xenophobic violence, as well as townships that had resisted the violence. However, it 
was much more difficult to gain access to these areas. A researcher affiliated with Wits gave 
me the contact information of the leader of the Sector 6 Alexandra Community Police 
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Forum, which is the largest in the township. The leader put me in touch with a community 
leader, who took me to the house of a Community Police Forum member in a sector of 
Alexandra where the violence had not occurred. She donned her Community Police Forum 
uniform, which consisted of a jacket and a baseball cap, both of which read, “Community 
Police Forum.” Then the three of us took my car to various spots around Alexandra, 
including the Pan Africa Market, which is where the xenophobic violence began.  
 
While it was easy to gain physical access to Alexandra, there was miscommunication between 
the community gatekeepers and myself. Though I made it clear that I was interested in 
speaking with small groups of people in a private space for an extended period of time, the 
community leaders took it upon themselves to chaperone me between vendor stalls, 
introduce me and ask questions on my behalf. When we came upon vendors who did not 
speak English, my contacts would translate for me. They also became very involved in the 
conversations – if a respondent mentioned xenophobic discrimination, the Community 
Police Forum member would immediately encourage the respondent to contact the Forum. 
While it was interesting to observe the interactions between Alexandra residents and local 
authorities, it was also clear that the community leaders’ presence were perversely affecting 
the interviews. Not only was I unable to ask the questions that I wanted to, but it was also 
clear that the dynamic of the interviews and the responses to sensitive questions about 
xenophobia were hugely impacted by the presence of a Community Police Forum member 
and a community leader.  
 
Before leaving South Africa, I tried to conduct interviews in both Alexandra and Soweto 
once more. The same dynamic occurred in Alexandra, where miscommunication with my 
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contacts led to interviews where the participant-interviewer dynamic was clearly impacted by 
power relations. As for Soweto, I was unable to make contacts there. Of the groups that I 
reached out to, the most responsive was the Soweto Backpackers, who I assumed had good 
relations with the community, seeing as how they led tours through the township. They had 
offered to set me up with a local guide, but the appointment remained unconfirmed after 
several weeks of back-and-forth e-mailing and phone calls. Thus, interviews were confined 
to the Methodist Church in downtown Johannesburg.  
 
The interviews 
I conducted interviews on six days between 28 September 2009 and 3 November 2009. 
These were group interviews, mainly comprised of groups of two or three. The first two 
group interviews had four and five participants respectively, but it became clear that 
participants with larger personalities overshadowed others in bigger groups. Almost all 
interviews were conducted between 5:00pm and 7:00pm on weeknights. One interview was 
conducted in the late morning, but I learned that the Church empties out in the day; my 
contact at the Church walked me around Pritchard Street and Von Brandeis Street to look 
for Church residents to interview.  
 
All interviews with migrants were conducted in both English and Shona. I learned from the 
first interview that even though the respondents had asserted that the interview should be 
conducted in English, they were more likely to respond if the question was asked in Shona. 
In all following interviews, I asked questions in English and the interpreter translated them 
into Shona. Participants were free to respond in whichever language they were more 
comfortable in; the vast majority of responses were in English. There were also times when 
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respondents did not understand my American accent and it was helpful to have the 
interpreter repeat the word or phrase in English with his Zimbabwean accent. The limitation 
of working in two languages, of course, was that responses in Shona were subject to 
translation and responses in English were subject to the participant’s command of the 
English language.  
 
A breakdown of the interviewees follows. Note that participation was voluntary, so some 
interviewees chose not to answer the descriptive questions below. This means that not all 
totals add up to thirty-one.  
 
 
Country of Origin 
 
 
South Africa 
 
Zimbabwe Zambia Kenya 
 
11 
 
18 1 1 
 
 
 
Gender 
 
 
Men 
 
Women 
 
19 
 
12 
 
 
 
Age Group 
 
 
18 – 19  
 
20 – 29 30 – 39 
 
4 
 
20 7 
 
 
 
Employment Status  
 
 
Employed 
 
Unemployed 
 
18 
 
12 
 
 
 
Migrants: Documentation Status 
 
 
Asylum 
 
Undocumented Passport 
 
14 
 
5 1 
 
 
 
Migrants: Length of Stay in South Africa 
 
 
0 – 1 years 
 
1 – 2 years 
 
14 
 
5 
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Limitations  
One of the limitations of this sample is that it was limited to Zimbabwean migrants and 
South Africans whose relationship to the political community in question was not 
immediately obvious. The Methodist Church is seen as a transitory space, where people stay 
anywhere from a couple of nights to several years. This meant that it was more difficult to 
screen for a community of origin, length of time in South Africa or even Johannesburg or 
involvement in the xenophobic attacks. That being said, the main experience I was interested 
in was that of acceptance or rejection. Everyone I spoke to had been somehow affected by 
the xenophobic attacks; I just was not able to control the stratification of interviewees as 
well as I would have liked.   
 
Another limitation of this sample is that it is self-selecting. One of the primary strategies that 
victims of xenophobic attacks used to protect against future violence was to move away 
from Johannesburg. Because interviews took place in the inner city, they naturally 
disregarded those who moved out of the city or across national lines to escape violence. 
Considering that the instrument was a semi-structured interview, the sample size was only 
thirty-one respondents and the goal was to understand perceptions of the attacks, this 
limitation did not concern me.  
 
A third limitation of the study was that I did not have control over how participants were 
chosen. The Church security guards, who all lived at the Church, guided the interpreter and I 
to a room as soon as we entered, and then they would go and find people for us to 
interview. The only parameter that we gave was “Shona-speaking”, based on the interpreter’s 
abilities. I believe that the guards tried of their own accord to find us even numbers of men 
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and women. Otherwise, factors such as documentation status, length of time in South 
Africa, employment status and age were all out of our hands.  
 
Challenges 
Though interviews went smoothly for the most part, there were several challenges that had 
to be addressed. First, although we had been publicly introduced to the majority of the 
Church residents, not all of the Church security guards had been made aware of the fact that 
the Bishop had given us permission to conduct interviews. This caused some small problems 
at first, since the security guards were the gatekeepers to the community. My notes from the 
second interview on September 29 read as follows: 
Once consent had been obtained [from the participants], it seemed that there 
was some problem with us being there. There was a conversation in Shona 
between Shingie (the interpreter) and one of the participants, who had left 
the group earlier to converse with someone (possibly a security guard). It 
seemed that the security guards, who we had not checked in with, had 
reported us to the Bishop.  
 
I was concerned because I did not know how much authority the guards had or whether 
they would abuse their position; respondents had previously told me that the guards take 
advantage of their authority in other situations, such as when donated supplies arrive. 
However, the Bishop verified my identity, word somehow passed to the security guards and 
we were not harassed or questioned at all during any of our following interview sessions.  
 
Another challenge was that the interpreter and I began to be recognised and greeted by 
Church residents and security guards – most likely because, as a young Asian American 
woman, I stand out quite distinctly from Church residents. Despite my emphasis on 
confidentiality, many people who I had interviewed in previous days would greet me from 
across the room when I arrived. Some previous participants even found ways to stay 
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involved in the research process. Consider these field notes from September 30, the third 
day of interviews: 
It was also interesting that we had six onlookers [in the interview], including 
the previous participant who showed us the t-shirts [of a group that had 
visited the Church earlier]. It felt like we were a spectacle that others wanted 
to watch (in a respectful way). This certainly had to do with the fact that we 
had taken over a room that was being used to watch TV (perhaps we were 
the new entertainment), but it also felt like people were genuinely interested. 
At any rate, we felt more established on this third day of interviews – 
everyone seemed to recognize us and know what we were about, and some 
people even wanted to observe us.  
 
Although I noted that Church residents seemed “genuinely interested” and “we felt more 
established on this third day of interviews”, it seems in hindsight that I should have been 
more concerned about becoming a “spectacle”.  
 
A final challenge was that our continued presence raised false expectations among Church 
residents. This was directly related to becoming a spectacle and losing anonymity in the 
participant community. While there were several instances where participants asked for 
payment or demanded that I give them something, the real concern was that I began to be 
harassed by Church residents who I did not know when I arrived at the Church alone. False 
expectations pose a risk to the legitimacy of a study, as participants may provide answers that 
they think are “correct” (see Barnes 2009). As Jacobsen & Landau (2003) ask, “why should a 
refugee tell a researcher anything that is not in their interests?” (11) However, considering 
that I made it clear to participants that no material goods would result from participation in 
the study, and the harassment came from individuals who were not involved in the study, I 
do not believe that the research itself was affected by these false expectations.  
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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
As with any study that involves vulnerable populations, there are several ethical issues to be 
aware of that may put participants at risk or jeopardise the integrity of the research (Jacobsen 
& Landau 2003; Leaning 2001; Mackenzie et al 2007). This project encountered four primary 
ethical considerations: confidentiality and consent, illegal behavior, language barriers and 
jeopardising strategies. This study has done its best to address them in a manner that “does 
no harm” to either the participants or the quality of research.  
 
First, confidentiality and consent were necessary to protect participants. Names of 
interviewees were not requested and were not recorded. Several respondents offered their 
names despite being told that it was not necessary; in these cases, their names were stricken 
from any written transcriptions. In order to further ensure anonymity, participants were not 
asked to sign a consent form. Instead, I requested verbal consent, both to participation as an 
interviewee and to the use of a tape recorder. In order to avoid unintentionally breaking 
confidentiality by revealing other identifying features in the final report, I have included very 
few descriptive details.  
 
Second, I expected that in asking marginalised people about sensitive subjects like access to 
rights and resources, as well as participation in the xenophobic attacks, I might uncover 
some illegal activity. Because participants were already at risk and experiencing 
socioeconomic and legal vulnerability, however, I did not plan to report illegal activities 
without consent. In the event that a truly heinous crime was perpetrated, I planned to break 
confidentiality and inform the University.  
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Third, it was important to the legitimacy of the qualitative study that participants were 
interviewed in a language that they felt comfortable in. However, the use of interpreters can 
undermine the neutrality of any research project. As in any research that relies on 
interpreters, it is possible that confidentiality may be put at risk if the interpreter and 
participant are from the same community, or that the participant may be prejudiced against 
the interpreter (or vice versa, especially in the case of xenophobia) (Jacobsen & Landau 
2003). To address these considerations, I worked with an experienced interpreter who 
understood the position’s emphasis on neutrality. The interpreter was a Shona-speaking 
Zimbabwean like many respondents, but he came from a different community than the 
respondents.  
 
Finally, publicising xenophobic rhetoric may unintentionally fan the flames of xenophobic 
sentiment. Many Zimbabwean respondents told me that they did not believe that 
xenophobic violence would return, whereas many South African respondents told me that 
they were sure that it would return after the 2010 World Cup. Publicising the tension 
between these two perspectives might unnecessarily and unintentionally cause ill will 
between the groups or even provoke an official, negative response from the authorities. In 
order to “do no harm” to vulnerable populations, I have tried to make it clear that the 
qualitative research I collected is being analysed in a purely theoretical context. It is also 
important to keep in mind the potential benefits that can follow publication of results: local 
groups may begin addressing the causes of xenophobia, the government may make a more 
concerted effort to protect those at risk, human rights groups may take more of an interest 
in urban rights issues and academics will have more practical knowledge about the nature of 
political community in Johannesburg.  
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the theory of political community in the context of the 2008 
xenophobic attacks and operationalised the concept so that it could be measured. It also 
described this study’s research design, interviews, limitations and challenges. As we analyse 
the collected data in the next chapter, it is important to keep in mind the four indicators of a 
political community that we defined in this chapter: guaranteed rights, shared values, 
consequential actions and the right to acts of exclusion. It is also important to recall that the 
“South African political community” in question generally refers to the sector of society that 
was excluded from the larger national identity during apartheid and, in the post-apartheid 
era, has gained legal status but has not necessarily gained access to everyday rights. However, 
it is recognised that this demographic neither implicates nor confines the political 
community; shared values are the real indicator of membership. Leading up to and during 
the 2008 xenophobic attacks, the political community under examination either supported or 
engaged in the violence. In the next chapter, I discuss the findings and what they indicate 
about the South African political community. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The South African Political Community: 
From Xenophobic Violence to Moral Maturity  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this study is to determine the shared values of the South African political 
community that supported and engaged in xenophobic rhetoric and violence, as well as to 
understand the way that this community makes sense of itself the value of membership. This 
chapter discusses the study’s findings. First, I discuss the shared values – language – that 
characterised the xenophobic attacks, as well as the way that members understood 
membership in their community – namely, there was a shared imagination about the 
availability of rights and resources, as well as how to obtain them. Second, I turn to the 
shared values and exclusionary discourse that the political community values today. There 
has been a drastic shift: rather than language and scarce resources, the community is 
concerned with its morality and brotherly love for African immigrants. Additionally, it 
aggressively excludes – through discourse – a subset of politicians, police and criminals who 
are blamed for inciting and encouraging the attacks. In the concluding chapter, I consider 
the reason behind this dramatic shift.  
 
A CHANGING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: SHARED VALUES 
The 2008 violence was dubbed the “xenophobic attacks” because it was seen as an act by 
South African citizens against foreigners. Considering the previous chapter’s discussion of 
the emergence of citizenship as a symbol of national belonging, as well as any accompanying 
anti-migrant rhetoric, this reading of the 2008 violence seems to fit. However, Zimbabwean 
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respondents argued that they would still be discriminated against if they became naturalised 
citizens, which suggests that at the time of the attacks, the South African political 
community placed little – if any – emphasis on shared legal status as a factor that enabled the 
right to have rights.  What is more, both Zimbabwean respondents explain that even if they 
become South African citizens, they will always been seen as “Zimbabwean by birth”. Not 
only does this demonstrate that legal citizenship is no longer an indicator of belonging, but 
that the South African political community does not recognise naturalised citizens as having 
meaningful action or speech – they are first and foremost seen as “Zimbabwean” or some 
other “other”.  
 
Consider the following quotes from Zimbabwean respondents discussing whether South 
African citizenship would impact their everyday lives.  
I can[‘t] say it [becoming a citizen] makes a difference because them [South 
Africans], they will be knowing that these people, they are Zimbabwean by 
birth. It’s only that they are now South Africans by having an identity [book]. 
But for them [South Africans], they [naturalised citizens] are Zimbabweans by birth. So 
I think it won’t make a difference, actually, it won’t make a difference. They 
will be having this mind of saying, those people, they are foreigners, and they 
will be having the thing of jealousy and you see, it doesn’t work. (Interview, 
Anonymous, 02.11.09, emphasis added) 
 
Something which recognises you, maybe to be a citizen, you apply to be a citizen, 
but you cannot adopt someone’s language. Even though you are giving a citizenship 
– (Outside interruption) I was saying, even though you are given a citizenship, but 
you can’t change your language. So it will make no difference in terms of being 
attacked by xenophobia. Because even you talk your language, you can’t be a 
citizen and then adopt someone’s language. Maybe your generation. But for 
you, as someone who came from another country, it will be very hard, it 
won’t be safe. Just to be a citizen, it won’t give you, like you say, now I’m 
very safe. I totally disagree with that one. If you be a citizen, it doesn’t mean you are 
safe. You are still in danger. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09, emphasis 
added) 
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The second respondent observes that, “if you be a citizen, it doesn’t mean you are safe” and 
“even though you are given a citizenship…you can’t change your language”. This suggests 
that language is a shared value that enables membership and is used as a basis for exclusion.  
 
Both migrants and citizens observe the importance of speaking the right language in South 
Africa. More specifically, the “right” languages are Zulu and Xhosa. English is an obvious 
indicator of outsider status; multiple respondents reported that an ambulance would come 
immediately if the call was placed in Zulu, but that it would take several hours if the call were 
placed in English. The following respondents explain that sharing a language is important to 
being included in South African society. 
As for our rights here, I think the main problem is the language barrier. 
Because if you are here, you are a foreigner, they expect you to be able to 
speak one of their languages so that you can communicate well. (Interview, 
Anonymous, 01.10.09) 
 
So at times even the police makes us feel nowhere to go when we come to 
some of these things because they really need you to talk in their language, of 
which it is very difficult. (Interview, Anonymous, 29.09.09) 
 
One – one of the barrier things that mainly affect us is the language. The 
people from this community, really, they [South Africans] – they think that if 
you cannot speak their language you are not their party. (Interview, Anonymous, 
29.09.09, emphasis added) 
 
I think what – what I want to add is, I see here in South Africa, if you want 
to live in South Africa, if you want to be – have good relationship with South Africa, 
you have to learn language of South Africa. Otherwise things will be better. 
(Interview, Anonymous, 01.10.09, emphasis added) 
 
In these cases, speaking a common language is necessary to everyday communication with 
South Africans, accessing police protection and generally having a “good relationship” with 
South Africans. While this indicates that language is important to social integration, it is 
hardly unique; sharing a language is a universal feature of integration in any society.  
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What makes language interesting to this study, however, is the perception that speaking the 
“wrong” language results directly in acts of exclusion by those who speak the “right” 
language. As the following respondents explain, xenophobic attackers will target people who 
they hear speaking foreign languages like Shona or Ndebele. If they hear people speaking 
Zulu, they will leave them alone. 
Sometimes if you are speaking the language [such as Shona or Ndebele] […] 
they [attackers] will catch you. But if you are using South African words it 
will be difficult for them to catch you. […] If you are using a South African 
language you will be safe. You will be safe. (Interview, Anonymous, 28.09.09) 
 
Sometimes I run away from them, sometimes they catch you. They heard you 
can speak Zulu, they leave you. They heard you can speak – if you can speak 
a language, a South African language, they will catch. (Interview, 
Anonymous, 28.09.09) 
 
You don’t have to [should not] talk louder when you are speaking [a foreign 
language], because they will know that these people, they are foreigners…. 
(Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
So I think – a language, normally, I speak English all – but I don’t know 
Zulu, even Xhosa, I don’t know the language – normally I use English. Even 
– even to quiet, I say “morning,” then I pass – that’s the only thing I can do. 
(Interview, Anonymous, 30.09.09) 
 
Both South Africans and Zimbabweans agreed with the observation that speaking a South 
African language indicated membership, while speaking a foreign language indicated an 
outsider status. For migrants like the last respondent, whose only shared language is English, 
this means that instead of actively speaking Zulu or Xhosa, they will actively stay silent. 
These findings suggest that one of the South African political community’s shared values 
was language capability. 
 
This shared value turned into an instrument of self-determination during the 2008 
xenophobic attacks. During this massive act of exclusion, it was widely reported that the 
perpetrators posed a linguistic test to determine whether or not to attack someone. In 
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interviews conducted in September 2008, two South African respondents explained that 
attackers identified foreigners by their language skills.  
Anywhere they could find a foreigner, he was beaten till he is not moving. 
They stopped people in the street, if you failed to respond in convincing 
Zulu, then you were beaten. It was sad state of affair. People were living in 
fear. (FMSP Interview, Anonymous, 29.08.08) 
 
They stopped taxis and said they were looking for Khalangas. Those they 
suspect they would interview them and challenge them to say difficult words 
like “elbows”. (FMSP Interview, Anonymous, 01.09.09) 
 
The use of language as a means to exclude outsiders is very telling in terms of the shared 
values that make up the South African political community. By identifying outsiders by 
whether they could pronounce difficult words like “elbows”, it is clear not only that the 
South African political community valued language, but that they understood their 
membership as being comprised of people who could speak a certain language. 
 
This perception of membership had major consequences, as not all South African citizens 
speak Zulu or Xhosa. The following South African respondents make it clear that legal 
citizens had no protection against the attacks and were given the same linguistic tests as 
outsiders. 
Yeah xenophobic – it was not about, like, foreigners only but it was just – 
everybody could come across it. Because nobody could even recognise are 
you a foreigner or not. So it could just accidentally happen to you when you 
are not, like, anticipating that it can happen. So it could come across to 
everybody. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
Yeah, you know, you cannot say I’m safe because you are a South African. 
Let’s say you have friends which are foreigners, you learn their language. You 
are found there talking their language, it means they won’t ask you a paper, 
they will just attack you. So everyone is not safe from xenophobia. 
(Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
You see here there is a [ethnic] group that I won’t mention that thinks it 
owns this place. You see I am Sotho; there is this thing that “you Pedis”. We 
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have that kind of tension here. If I recall the xenophobic violence, there were 
statements that “you Pedis are next”. (IOM 2009: 37) 
 
As the above respondents describe, citizens were also victims of the attacks. As the last 
quote suggests, it seemed that a second wave of violence would be unleashed upon minority 
citizens. Further evidence of citizens as targets of xenophobic violence can be found in the 
21 South Africans who died in the 2008 attacks, making up one-third of the total death rate 
(CoRMSA 2008; IOM 2009). 
 
Quantitative studies also support these findings, which show that language has replaced legal 
citizenship, both as a symbol of belonging and as a factor that enables the right to have 
rights. According to a comparative analysis of South Africans in 2004 and 2007, language 
and ethnicity have become increasingly important factors in self-identification, while the 
descriptor “South African” has become less important (IOM 2009). 
Comparative analysis (2004 and 2007) of identity-based self description 
shows that an African descriptor as well as race descriptor have declined 
along with a constant South African descriptor, whilst a language/ethnic 
description has increased. Confidence in a happy future for all races 
decreased from 77% in November 2007 to 38% in 2008. When a sentiment 
like this weakens so drastically in seven months, it is cause for concern. (IOM 
2009: 11) 
 
This finding emphasises the importance of language and ethnicity to the South African 
political community, as well as the decreasing importance of legal citizenship. Furthermore, 
the Human Rights Watch finding that 20% of the inmates at Lindela Detention Facility were 
South African in 1998 (Kihato & Landau 2006) suggests that this trend began at least one 
decade before the xenophobic attacks. It is interesting that my research found a minimal 
emphasis on ethnicity, while other qualitative and quantitative studies have found seemingly 
equal emphasis on language and ethnicity. 
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This section has established that the South African political community views language as a 
fundamental enabler of the right to have rights. Language is used to exclude outsiders in 
daily activities, and it was used to identify non-members during the xenophobic attacks. It 
also sheds light on the makeup of the political community – that is, that it excludes certain 
South Africa-born citizens like Sotho-speaking Pedis. The community can be further 
understood by examining the way that members make sense of what it means to be a 
member. 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY: IMAGINED RIGHTS AND RESOURCES 
Violent tension between immigrants and citizens is hardly unique to South Africa, especially 
when it is fueled by competition over scarce resources. However, members of the political 
community do not imagine the resources as scarce; instead, they imagine that there are a 
finite amount of resources, the total of which is just enough for all citizens. Furthermore, 
South Africans imagine that migrants have equal access to rights in their home countries, 
which heightens jealousy over South Africa’s resources. Finally, South Africans imagine that 
migrants circumvent the system and cheat citizens out of resources that are rightfully theirs. 
This involves an imagined perception of how the system works and how South Africans 
themselves access the system. While these findings may not be new or surprising, they 
highlight the way that the South African political community understands membership and, 
by extension, how they understand and determine their admissions policies.  
 
A finite amount of resources 
Many South African citizens, poor ones in particular, do not actually experience the rights 
that they are entitled to. Consider the following. Section 26 (1) of the Constitution states 
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that, “everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing”. According to the 
Department of Housing, over two million subsidised houses had either been completed or 
were in the process of completion by June 2006. This means that one decade after the 
Constitution had been approved, only half of the households in need had accessed their right 
to “adequate housing”. Consider, too, Section 27 (1) of the Constitution, which states that, 
“everyone has the right to have access to…sufficient food and water”. In 2000, South Africa 
established the Free Basic Water policy, which was aimed at poor households and provided 
for 6,000 litres of free water each month (Hall et al 2006; Mehta 2005). According to the 
General Household Survey, however, approximately 42% of children in South Africa did not 
have access to drinking water in 2005. (Hall et al 2006) 
 
The circumstances leading up to the 2000 Grootboom housing case further illustrate the gap 
between constitutional rights and experienced rights. In the fourteen years following the end 
of apartheid, only two percent of land was redistributed; this means that white commercial 
farmers owned 80% of the land, while 13 – 14 million citizens did not have access to land, 
despite their constitutional right to adequate housing and shelter. The Grootboom case 
originated in Wallacedene, a township outside of Cape Town, which was characterised by 
high rates of disease, no health services and little access to water. After the municipality 
refused to improve living conditions, 900 citizens moved illegally to privately owned land in 
1998. The private landowner eventually evicted the community of 900, but they were unable 
to return to their shacks in Wallacedene, which were now occupied by other families.3 
                                                
3 In 2000, the Wallacedene community demanded that the government provide them with access to 
services and housing, as guaranteed in the Constitution. While the court found in favor of the 
Wallacedene community, the fact remains that citizens did not realise their rights to basic services like 
shelter, water and health care until they brought a legal case against the government. (Williams 2005) 
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(Williams 2005) These cases make it even clearer that many poor South Africans are not “full 
citizens”; they are citizens in name only.  
 
Instead of blaming the government for inadequate access to legally guaranteed rights, 
however, South Africans developed a discourse that blames illegal black African immigrants 
for lowering wages, spreading disease and monopolising resources. Murray (2003) explains 
that this discourse imagines immigrants’ universal illegality and complicity in degrading 
society:  
In the popular imagination, the “infestation of illegal aliens” is responsible 
for importing foreign diseases, depressing wages, consuming social services, 
exacerbating unemployment, destroying local parks and recreational facilities, 
transforming once-stylish inner city neighborhoods into squalid slums, and 
even causing the depreciation of the rand and hikes in interest rates. (449) 
 
This discourse is rooted in the creation of a post-apartheid national identity. Without a 
universally shared culture, language or perception of history to draw on, post-apartheid 
nationalism concentrates on a shared citizenship rather than a shared past (Landau 2005; 
Murray 2003; Peberdy 2001; Reitzes and Bam 2000). Peberdy (2001) observes that, “By 
stressing the entitlements of citizens to state resources within the new nation-building 
project, the emphasis has shifted to keeping out those who do not belong and preventing 
anyone else from joining, especially those who have the ‘wrong citizenship’” (28). In other 
words, previously excluded citizens found that the only way to claim their national belonging 
was to begin excluding others. 
 
In this type of widespread rhetoric, which pits citizens and immigrants against each other in 
competition for scarce resources, South Africa is imagined as a halcyon state with just 
enough resources for all of its citizens. Peberdy (2001) observes that,  
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Despite these inequalities and the enormous problems in delivering services 
to all, when it comes to immigration the state sees itself as exceptionally well 
endowed with infrastructure, resources, and services in comparison to other 
African countries. South Africa is thus represented as a ‘magnet’ or ‘land of 
milk and honey’ in Africa. (25)  
 
Because citizenship does not provide equality, a necessary discourse has arisen alongside 
citizenship that imagines that citizens would receive equal rights, were it not for migrants. 
Mehta (2005) points out that, “broad and all-inclusive notions of citizenship may not 
adequately question existing power relations, which often benefit the dominant groups” 
(239). Instead of questioning the extent and value of their citizenship, then, marginalised 
South Africans cling to the idea of an “all-inclusive notion of citizenship”, which they justify 
by imagining that outsiders are taking what rightfully belongs to citizens.   
 
Consider that Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) houses were one point 
of contention. Intended to address the inequalities brought about by apartheid, only 5 
million of 12.5 million South Africans without adequate housing had been placed in RDP 
housing by 2001 (see www.metagora.org). By 2008, South Africans were blaming foreigners 
for cheating the system and taking houses that rightfully belonged to citizens. In an interview 
following the xenophobic violence, one South African asked, “[H]ow can a person [a 
foreigner] of my son’s age own an RDP house while old people who have been on waiting 
lists for years do not? Foreigners who were born in 1985 not even in South Africa own RDP 
houses in Ext. 7. How old were they when they got here?”4 (IOM 2009: 19) This example 
demonstrates the widespread notions that, first, there are enough houses to go around and, 
second, that the reason that South Africans do not have access to those houses is because 
                                                
4 In order to qualify for a government-subsidised house, applicants must be either citizens or legal 
residents of South Africa, and be over 21 years old. (Hall et al, 2006) 
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migrants have inveigled their way into them first. This type of rhetoric was crucial to the 
buildup and carrying out of the 2008 attacks. 
 
Migrants have access to the same rights back home 
There is also a perception among underprivileged South Africans that there are enough 
rights to go around in Zimbabwe. This is combined with the perception above that there are 
a finite amount of resources in South Africa. Taken together, the political community sees 
little reason to admit Zimbabweans into the South African political community, which 
would give them access to rights that belong to South Africans.  
 
Consider the following quotes, which capture the South African image of Zimbabweans as 
having resources – or, at least, access to resources – back home. Based on these imagined 
resources, the South African political community exercises exclusion. The following 
participants also indicate that some South Africans see Zimbabweans as “cowards” who 
“cannot stand up to our own government”. This suggests that South Africans might also 
value tenacity in its members.  
Normally, yes, policies in South Africa is – not for – for normally for not for 
us, Zimbabwean people. Can I say because – if you want to report there they 
can say, go back to Mugabe. So – for us, it’s very difficult. For – for others here, 
it’s good. It’s not for us – as people from Zimbabwe is – not treat us well, 
yes. (Interview, Anonymous, 30.09.09, emphasis added) 
 
And when you are arrested, like if you are a Zimbabwean, they call you 
names, insults, everything and the like, so these things of saying go back to your 
country, what do you want here, you chase the – the whites and you know – you gave 
your land to – to plow, what do you want here? Actually, it – it contributes a lot. I 
think three quarters of the Zimbabweans are just being ill-treated because of 
that – because they are Zimbabweans. (Interview, Anonymous, 29.09.09, 
emphasis added) 
 
And in their own view they [South Africans] view us as cowards, you know, that we 
cannot stand up to our own government, [that] our only solution is to run away, you 
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know. And so they just consider us to be people who are inferior to them 
and sometimes for the rights – especially in workplaces and stuff – it’s very 
difficult to get a job or to be able to be paid well because they’ll just be 
considering us, you know, these people, they don’t think well. (Interview, 
Anonymous, 01.10.09, emphasis added) 
 
These participants have been excluded from the South African political community on the 
basis that they either have resources back home in Zimbabwe, or that they made a deal with 
the “whites” and that it is not their fault that the deal did not work out for them. This 
suggests that South Africans place a high value on their own resources – they will not admit 
anyone who they think can access basic rights elsewhere. 
 
Zimbabwean interviewees also stressed the fact that South Africans should learn more about 
the situation in Zimbabwe before judging Zimbabwean migrants. The following participants 
emphasise that there is a discrepancy between realised rights and guaranteed rights in their 
home country, but that South Africans are only considering the guaranteed rights. 
Because how can you say you have given a child food when you give him or 
her food that is not cooked when you know that she’s five or ten years – 
she’s five years or three years, how can she cook? How can she eat dirty 
food? Automatically you run out to the next door, where she eat cooked 
food, because if you give that child raw food it will – it will help – it’s 
nothing – it’s like you have given that child nothing. So it’s just like us. Of 
course the land was given to us, we will let accept it was given, but then how can you go and 
plow the land when you don’t have the seeds, the fertilisers, the – the apparatus are not 
there. So it’s just like we’ve not been given that land. (Interview, Anonymous, 
29.09.09, emphasis added) 
 
If it was that they [South Africans] needed [wanted] to know why do the 
people have abandoned all that was given to them by the government run 
away, it was something better [it would be better if they wanted to know], [but] 
they don’t, they just say go back to your country. (Interview, Anonymous, 
29.09.09, emphasis added) 
 
So they should dig further, they should find out more. And learn more than just 
accusing the people, saying that you fleed [sic] from your country because 
you are useless, you are what. They should find more and see actually which 
is the actually causing, where is the reason that people flee from their 
countries. Because of course it was known – and they will see the people in 
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TV’s being brutalised, everything and the like, people fleeing. Because a 
mother cannot just run away and leave her child and come to another 
country and say that that person is lazy and doesn’t want to farm. They 
should dig – they should find more before they accuse people. (Interview, 
Anonymous, 29.09.09, emphasis added)  
 
These respondents explain that while they have land, they do not have the “apparatus” to 
farm it. They ask what alternatives they have when their children are hungry, other than 
migrating to South Africa to look for work. They also say that South Africans do not 
understand these complexities and instead believe that Zimbabweans flee because they are 
“useless”. This is particularly revealing about the South African political community, because 
it shows that Zimbabwean migrants’ actions – of fleeing, of searching for employment – are 
seen as “necessary consequences” (Arendt 1951: 301) of being “lazy” Zimbabweans. While 
language is an indicator of inclusion in the political community, the typecasting of 
Zimbabweans is an indicator of discursive exclusion. 
 
Imagined ways of accessing rights 
In addition to imagining that Zimbabwean migrants can access resources in their home 
country, South Africans also imagine that they access rights in South Africa by 
circumventing the legal system, thus cheating South African citizens out of their deserved 
rights. In this imagining, South Africans have cast documentation as a false enabler of rights. 
One citizen agrees that documentation enables rights, and explains that foreigners cheat the 
system by purchasing documentation: “[O]nce you have an ID, you qualify for the 
[subsidised] house. […] Do you know how much the ID is, it is about R400.” (FMSP 
Interview, Anonymous, 01.09.08). Another citizen explains that migrants are in cahoots with 
corrupt government officials at the Department of Home Affairs: “There are migrants who 
have valid ID documents, because they collaborate with other South Africans who work at 
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Home Affairs” (FMSP Interview, Anonymous, 01.09.08). Documentation, in other words, is 
a false enabler of rights that migrants use to cheat the system and illegally access rights that 
belong to South Africans. 
 
The reality, however, is that migrants have a fraught relationship with documentation. The 
Migrant Mobilisation report (FMSP 2009c) shows that migrants perceive legal documentation 
as simultaneously necessary and useless. While documentation helps migrants access certain 
social rights that the Constitution guarantees, money often speaks louder than papers when 
migrants – whether documented or undocumented – are harassed by the police: 
…documentation is necessary for housing, schooling, opening a bank 
account, employment, medicine and more. But even with documentation, it 
is easy to be harassed. One respondent explained, “Even if you do have 
papers, you can still be arrested. Whereas if you have 200 rand, you won’t be 
arrested. So papers help sometimes and don’t help other times.” (FMSP 
2009c: 17) 
 
Police not only ignore documentation and the rights associated with legal papers, but they go 
so far as to destroy papers or prevent migrants from fetching them from home in order to 
legitimise their arbitrary arrests (see Landau 2005; www.iss.co.za). A Sierra Leonean man 
describes his experience, which is hardly unique among migrants:  
The police asked me for my refugee paper, which had not yet expired. They 
say, “f-k you” and they just tear the paper and seize my money and cell-
phone…So then, what they do is take me to the police station. I was 
shouting…[and] one of them just removed something like a little shocker. 
He was shocking me…say that I was to shut up and if I wasn’t shut up, he 
was going to shock me until I die. (Palmary et al 2003: 113) 
 
Documentation, in other words, is an arbitrary protector of rights. Even individuals with 
legal papers are vulnerable to police extortion, harassment and arrest. 
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What is more, South Africans themselves do not have universal access to documentation. 
This reinforces the finding that citizens have an imagined sense of the rights that they are 
entitled to, how to access them and how migrants access them. After all, if migrants are 
believed to access rights through fake documentation, it should be a given that citizens use 
real documentation to access them. However, a significant amount of South Africa’s 
population is not registered in the country’s census. Kihato & Landau (2006) explain that, 
Among both South Africans and migrants, fewer than 40% of people have 
birth certificates, a primary means by which the state accounts for its 
population. Even those who do have such documents are unlikely to have 
filed copies with the South African government. And even children born in 
South Africa to foreigners are less likely to be registered: only around 20% of 
foreigners’ children had birth certificates compared to 60% of South 
Africans. (9) 
 
These statistics show that the idea that migrants “cheat” the system by using documentation 
is imagined, since South Africans would have to have access to the system first in order to be 
cheated out of it. 
 
WHO IS THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY? 
These findings indicate key characteristics about the political community in question and 
they way that they understand and value membership in their community. First, legal 
citizenship did not necessarily make a person a member of the political community. Second, 
language was highly valued as a characteristic of included members. Third, members 
imagined that the community had access to a finite amount of resources. Fourth, outsiders 
were imagined as illicitly taking these resources, even though they had access to resources in 
their countries of origin. While these characteristics point to the underprivileged class of 
black South Africans who had legal status but none of the privileges that accompanied it, it is 
important to emphasise the fact that this study is not concerned with identifying the 
 84 
population and demographic statistics of the political community, but with identifying 
shared values and perceptions about the meaning of membership. 
 
The following respondents give compelling reasons for why we should not generalise about 
the descriptive statistics of the political community. For one thing, the violence did not 
break out everywhere and the anti-migrant rhetoric did not pervade all sectors of society that 
poor black South Africans did. The interviewee below describes one community in which 
the prevalence of “white people” and “property” meant that community residents did not 
partake in the rhetoric, despite the presence of poor black South Africans. 
I was once in Mpumalanga province, in a city called Malelane. That city I 
stayed, I stayed in that city, something like for eight to nine months. I haven’t 
even seen any people being robbed of their own things. There, most people, 
they look for, they only look, focus on look for money and jobs. And that 
city is too quiet, it’s too small. There are plenty of white people, and some 
colored people, and some few [black] South Africans. So I can say, especially 
when you are sitting, or when you are living, the places where there are 
located, where there are a lot of white people and some other people from 
some other countries, I can say it’s too quiet and there’s no crime. Because 
those people have got money. So police is going be strict in that – those areas 
because they know that those people, they have to take care of their 
properties and they have to defend them when they’re going to work, say, 
when they are all living places, and also to their children, when they are going 
to schools and college and something like that. (Interview, Anonymous, 
02.11.09) 
 
According to this respondent, communities like Malelane in Mpumalanga province neither 
supported nor experienced xenophobic sentiments or violence. The Malelane community, 
which chose not to be a member of the South African political community under 
examination, is characterised by white people, wealth and a small-town feel. Because “those 
people have got money” the police are stricter and more active about “defending” their 
property.   
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For another, the respondents below take a moral stance and point out that we cannot 
generalise about South African society as a whole. The first respondent points out that 
during the attacks, several South Africans visited migrant communities with supplies and aid. 
The second respondent cautions against making sweeping statements about an entire 
population. 
Not all South Africans are bad. Other ones they are nice, other ones they are 
not nice. Because if you see like that time of xenophobia, other people they 
bring us food here and clothes, so I – what can I say, it’s only half-half. 
(Interview, Anonymous, 29.09.09) 
 
You know, if you put eggs in a basket, if one egg breaks – if the one egg 
broke, the others are safe. (Interview, Anonymous, 28.09.09) 
 
According to these respondents, both of whom are migrants, people who could be assumed 
to be part of the South African political community based on their demographics, actively 
distanced themselves from the community.  
 
A NEW POLITICAL COMMUNITY 
The xenophobic attacks offered a snapshot into the political community in May 2008. They 
showed a community, underprivileged and angry, that lashed out at outsiders. A year and a 
half after the attacks, however, a new discourse is brewing and it reveals completely different 
values and bases of exclusion. Instead of a political community that jealously guards its finite 
resources and values language and ethnicity, the emerging political community casts itself as 
having moral, mature members who accept blame for the attacks but insist that they have 
become “civilised” and now welcome migrants with open arms. The new discourse excludes 
those who are immoral from its membership base, primarily through re-imagining the 2008 
attacks and blaming the cops, criminals and cabinet members who are seen to have incited, 
encouraged and profited from the violence.  
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THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN: SHARED VALUES 
A surprising finding came out of discussions with South Africans about factors that enable 
protection from xenophobic violence. In addition to the international community, South 
African respondents identified themselves as enabling protection from xenophobic violence. 
More specifically, respondents identified a moral, mature South African as enabling 
protection. The creation of this archetypal citizen occurred in four parts: establishing South 
Africans first as a collective body, next as a moral body, then as a mature body and finally as 
a sustainable body.  
 
South Africans as a collective body 
South African respondents have developed a language of shared responsibility and guilt for 
the 2008 xenophobic attacks. Even people who adamantly condemn the attacks and try to 
remove themselves from association with the attacks perpetuated the notion of a collective 
South African body, one that simultaneously took responsibility for the attacks and was 
ashamed by them. For example, the following respondent denied that he participated in the 
attacks, yet he still refers to those who participated as “us South Africans” and “we”. He 
assumes a collective guilt on behalf of the entire nation when he says, “So I can’t just point 
at…somebody I know…[because] all of we, we did it”.  
Yeah, you could see many people beating people. Many of them, you 
couldn’t even recognise who is this or…but you could see even, you could 
see someone you know, but there were many people. You couldn’t recognise 
who is he, who is who, who is who. But the fact is, us South Africans, about 
75%, we participated in the xenophobic attacks. You can’t deny that one 
because we are the ones who started it. So I can’t just point at saying, 
somebody I know or what, just all of we, we did it. (Interview, Anonymous, 
02.11.09) 
 
By refusing to point fingers in individuals involved in the attacks, even while condemning 
them, this respondent’s double message spoke strongly of the fact that South Africans were 
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accepting a shared guilt and defense of the attacks. Two other respondents also vehemently 
denied participation in the attacks and insightfully explained the jealousy and lack of 
understanding that precipitated the attacks, yet they still claimed that, “us as South Africans, 
I don’t think we quite consider that one [plight of Zimbabweans]” (Interview, Anonymous, 
01.11.09) and “we South Africans, we liked it” (Interview, Anonymous, 01.11.09) 
 
Furthermore, South African respondents accepted and placed upon their shoulders the 
negative stereotypes of South Africans. They claimed collective “laziness” or “jealousy”, 
even when it was clear that the individual respondents were actively searching for work and 
did not agree with the xenophobic attacks. Again, respondents assume the mantle and talk 
about “we” the South Africans as a collective group. Consider the following quotes, in which 
South African respondents manage to both decry xenophobia and exhibit an understanding 
of the overall situation while accepting responsibility for the general mindset that caused it. 
We don’t want to work. So those people who want to work [such as 
migrants], they come and get work, get jobs. So we think that they’re the 
ones causing problems, are [the reason we are] not getting our work. But at 
the other end, if you look those people, they are boosting, they are also 
helping to boost our economy. And they are also hard workers than us. We 
want everything for free. So that’s not good. We have to work to survive. We 
have to work hard. So I don’t support the issue of xenophobia. I don’t 
support it. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
I want to add on what he says, about the thing of xenophobia thing. You 
know us people, we are laziest people in the world, we don’t like to work. 
[…] Yeah, South Africans. We don’t want – we don’t like working. We only 
need – when we go to work, we go and will work properly. When it is 
money, when we get money and our salary, we eat whole money. When it is 
finished, and when the time, during the time when we are eating that salary, 
we will not be going to work. When that money gets finished, by the time 
when we will be thinking about go back to work. So when we go back to 
work, our boss will be saying no, there’s no more work, you have already put 
another foreigner. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
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The most interesting point here is that these respondents all denounce the xenophobic 
attacks and are themselves looking for jobs. They are clearly not the “lazy” South Africans 
that are universally blamed for being “jealous” and starting the attacks, yet they assume 
blame and identify themselves with those South Africans by speaking about “us” and “we”.  
 
South Africans as moral 
South African respondents established the South African collective body as a moral one by 
identifying three key indicators. First, respondents focused on the moral values inherent in 
South African citizens. For example, many participants claimed that the reason the attacks 
stopped is because South Africans realised that what they were doing was “bad”. Although 
the attacks officially ended after the South African Defense Force was brought in after two 
weeks, respondents argued that the police are simply a convenient explanation for the end of 
the attacks, but not the real reason behind them. The truth is that they were stopped by 
citizens’ sense of humanity: 
Yeah, we South Africans, we can say […] we were stopped by the 
police…but as a human being, you can feel a sense that, you know, 
somebody’s life is not just…easy to take. We could feel inside just a feeling 
of reconciliation because when you, a person, just thinking and realise that, 
why am I doing this, why am I beating people, and what-what-what. And you 
could have an answer in your head that can even stop saying, you know, 
beating people is not alright. People just stopped on their own, just realising 
that, you know, it’s not a good thing. […] But we can’t say the police stopped 
it or the government. It was just people reconciliating [sic] each other. 
(Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
As this respondent notes, “people just stopped on their own” after realising that “beating 
people is not alright”. This sense of morality was not imposed by the government, but by 
citizens’ inner humanity: “as a human being, you can feel a sense that […] somebody’s life is 
not just…easy to take”. Another respondent says, “if you have love, you won’t attack 
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someone” ((Interview, Anonymous, 01.11.09). The South African collective body, then, is 
inherently moral and is guided by its love of fellow human beings. 
 
Second, South Africans work to separate the average, moral South African from the corrupt 
politicians and criminals, who are described as masterminding and carrying out the attacks. 
Respondents stressed that most South Africans were ashamed of the attacks, whereas the 
criminals and politicians had no shame and actually benefited from the attacks. 
[M]ost of South Africans, most were ashamed but some they just, see like 
those robbers, they just wish that it could come back again and we could start 
getting money. And most of us South Africans, we are ashamed because it 
was something like, you know, beating somebody for no reason just to say 
foreigners, start beating, and you see him again tomorrow, can be ashamed. 
So most of us, we are ashamed. But a small number just wish to come again. 
Mostly people, criminals, and some other like politicians. (Interview, 
Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
In this case, the respondent is careful to draw a line between “most of us South Africans” 
who were ashamed by the attacks and “a small number” of “criminals” and “politicians” 
who were “getting money” and profiting politically from the attacks.  
 
Other respondents take it one step further and claim that the government, police and 
criminals were not only profiting from the attacks, but were in cahoots with each other to 
start the attacks. In this discourse, the average South African is completely sidelined, and the 
Cabinet, Cops and Criminals all have control. Because of their agreement with the Criminals, 
the Cabinet and Cops only step in when migrants begin to flee the country.  
So what I can say is, this thing of xenophobia thing, I think it’s also those 
cops people. They’re also involved in this thing of xenophobia. Cops people, 
the Cabinet, and criminal people. I think criminal people, they need to start 
the thing of xenophobia thing. I think they sat down, they sit down with cops 
and the cabinet saying no, we have to start the thing of xenophobia thing. 
And I think they’re being given the go-ahead by the Cabinet to start the thing 
of xenophobia thing. So when they do their thing, they can ignore the thing 
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of xenophobia thing for something like one week to two weeks. When they 
see that now, for now, most of the foreigner people, they are fleeing [to] their 
home country, that’s the time when they step in, starting to just stop the 
thing of fighting and shooting people with rubber bullets. But I think they 
are involved in this thing, this issue of xenophobia thing. (Interview, 
Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
In pinning the guilt on the cops, the cabinet and the criminals, South African respondents 
achieve two things: first, they remove responsibility from their own shoulders – as in, they 
are not responsible for the attacks occurring or for their atrocious length – and, second, they 
define the average South African against the corrupt criminals, government and police. And 
in such a light, the average South African stands out as removed, ashamed and, inevitably, 
moral. 
 
Finally, respondents create a moral prototype of the South African citizen by portraying 
themselves – that is, the average citizen who did not take part in the attacks and was 
thoroughly ashamed by them – as productive members of society. Respondents repeatedly 
explained that the reason the attacks did not spread throughout society was because most 
South Africans have jobs and were busy working. As one respondent explains, it was the 
unemployed people in certain townships who do not do anything all day who started and 
continued the attacks. 
…[P]eople are always busy. You know, people, they go to work. So you will 
find that someone who is going to work did not have time to go and beat 
people. Then I think these people, they [perpetrators] are unemployed 
people, that’s why I will say, I told you, some of, most of them are tsotsis. […] 
They don’t go away, they don’t go to work. So most of the people, they were 
not interested [in joining the attacks] because they had something to do. And 
there were many, many things to do. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
The respondent draws a line between employed and unemployed South Africans: those are 
employed “were not interested because they had something to do” – their productivity and 
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work kept them from behaving immorally – while those who are unemployed were those 
who had “time to go and beat people”.  
 
Other respondents supported this distinction and took it one step further by relating 
productivity and morality to urban life and unemployment and immorality with township 
life. The employed South Africans who did not participate in the attacks stay in town, while 
the unemployed South Africans who did participate in the attacks stay in the townships.  
And I think here in the town xenophobia is far much safer than in the 
locations [townships] because in the locations, a lot of people are there and 
usually people who do not have something to do stays in the location, 
everything and the like, so they have got time to guard that – plot – for 
things like xenophobia, they can easily get involved in, like most of the 
people in the town believed that their own business – so it’s very difficult to 
divert your business into another business, especially that will not benefit 
you, or that will make you lose what you have come for when you come 
from your place, coming into town. So I think the town, it’s far much safer 
than in the locations where a lot of people are sitting, have nothing to do and 
they can just organise themselves very quickly and very easily. (Interview, 
Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
The active distinction between “town” South Africans and “location” South Africans is 
interesting because it is an active distinction between “us” and “them.” In this case, “us” is 
the respondents who are moral and contribute to society, while “they” are the South 
Africans who are immoral and either unable or unwilling to contribute to society.  
 
South Africans as mature citizens 
In remembering the attacks, respondents also created a discourse of transition and learning 
in the aftermath of the attacks, thus casting the prototypical South African citizen as not 
only moral, but mature. For example, respondents frequently cited South Africa as having 
“learned its lesson” that it should not solve problems using violence. As the following 
participant notes, xenophobic attacks will not happen again because citizens made the 
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“mistake” of participating in them and have since become “civilised” people who know 
better than to “beat each other”. 
My point of view, xenophobia, I don’t think it will happen again. Because 
you see, beating somebody who doesn’t revenge, it’s not very easy to attack 
him next time. And he – in fact, just beating each other, that doesn’t solve 
anything. […] So people, they just realised that it was a mistake, being 
xenophobic or beating. […] I think the happening of the xenophobia, it 
civilised mostly us, South Africans, because we could realise that no, this is a 
good – this is not a good thing. So I don’t think it will happen again. Don’t 
think so. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
By emphasising the transition between the South African society that engaged in xenophobic 
attacks and the South African society that knows better, respondents achieve a twofold aim: 
first, the archetypal citizen is seen as a responsible adult to be trusted rather than an 
impetuous child and second, citizens are able to chalk up the violence to their “uncivilised”, 
immature stage as an adolescent.  
 
South Africans in the future 
Finally, the prototypical moral, mature South African citizen was also created as sustainable, 
thereby providing comfort that this citizen that would enable protection would last long 
enough to actually enable protection from future attacks. In creating the sustainable 
characteristic of the citizen, South African respondents tended to create shared prescriptions 
for the future, namely that South Africans must become more moral and South Africa must 
be seen as a place where morality reigns supreme. The following respondent says that South 
Africans must learn to love their neighbors in the future: 
It’s a touching issue which must touch the South Africans and they welcome 
the foreigners, they give them shelter, accommodation, they help them, or 
they help them nationally, to protect against the difficulties which they face 
in their nation. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09)  
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In other words, the attacks will stop when South Africa becomes more humane. Other 
respondents say that South Africa as a nation must offer protection and safety to other non-
nationals who are fleeing their own countries: 
It’s not good to fight each other, especially foreigners. Most of them, they are 
our neighbors. So most of them, they run away from their countries because 
of this situation, they need a better life. So we have to play our role that we 
must help them, they need our help, they need our love. So if we are fighting 
them, we are not showing the world that we love, we have got love, we are a 
unit (?). That’s not the freedom. We have to, about the languages – yes, of 
course, we have to learn all the types of languages, that’s good. Because how 
can we fight for each other? All, we are the same. When God looks at us, we 
are the same. There’s no Shona, there’s no Zulu, there’s no Xhosa, there’s no 
one. There’s same. There’s no need for us to fight. (Interview, Anonymous, 
02.11.09) 
 
The following respondent agrees: 
The foreigners must feel more safe here in a foreign country than in their 
home. We want South Africa to be such kind of a country which is, we 
accommodate the foreigners, feel safer than their country, as they flee their 
country to, expecting to get that one, indeed they must get the, they must 
upset them, we give them safety, they stay, they solve the differences in their 
country, then they go back safely, they thank the South Africa for what they 
have been done for them. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
The point here is that South Africans are prescribing more morality for the future; migrants 
will be protected from xenophobic attacks once South Africans learn to love their neighbors.  
 
A second part of the argument that South Africans are all moral is found in the discourse 
about what South Africans must do now. Most of the prescriptions from South Africans to 
South Africans are to “love your brother.” Many respondents drew on the idea of being part 
of an African family.  
And about xenophobia, the only way [forward] is just, you have to love your 
– love your neighbor. Isn’t it. Just love somebody and understand that he’s a 
Zimbabwean. In Zimbabwe, there’s – see this crisis, what-what, and we are 
all brothers, African brothers. From Europe, whatever, we are just the same 
– we have just to feel sensitive towards each other. That’s the way we can do 
it. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
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Interestingly, this sentiment addresses migrants’ arguments that South Africans cast them as 
“lazy” and “cowards” without trying to understand the history and implications of the crisis 
in Zimbabwe. As this South African says, “a human being is a human being and you can’t 
just hate somebody because he’s from a foreign land or what-what-what” (Interview, 
Anonymous, 01.11.09). 
 
A NEW TYPE OF EXCLUSION 
In interviews one year after the attacks, people who were asked to recount what happened 
were actually recreating their understanding of what happened. This recreation reflects the 
new shared values above; while respondents do not deny what happened, they seek to blame 
others in order to maintain their new image of themselves. Four themes emerge in the 
public, shared remembrance of the cause of the xenophobic attacks. It is notable that very 
few respondents identified resources as the cause. Instead, most of the blame fell on corrupt 
cabinet members or criminals. A constant refrain was that “someone must be benefiting” for 
the attacks to have been so violent, widespread and long. The benefit ranges from simple 
material gain by criminals to political gain by corrupt politicians. It is remarkable that despite 
the widespread anti-migrant rhetoric and the fact that attackers used language to single out 
victims, this discourse placed the lion’s share of blame on outsiders such as criminals and 
tsotsis, who had something to gain from the attacks. This shows a marked change of how 
people understand the act of exclusion. 
 
One of the groups that the political community actively excludes is that of community 
leaders who had personal reasons for condoning the attacks. The following respondents 
indicate that in certain areas of the country, chiefs and elders made the executive decision as 
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to whether or not the entire community would engage in the xenophobic attacks, based on 
deep-seated, historical hatred of foreigners, for example, or the promise of more political 
power as a supporter of the violence. 
Sometimes it depends with the chiefs. They can give orders, here we’re doing 
xenophobia or beating people here. So I think the go-ahead was all about the 
chiefs or the councilors. The councilor says no, he will address people and 
say ah, I don’t want xenophobia in my place. So I think where it happens, the 
bosses had to agree so that it happens. Because they couldn’t just told those people 
with immediate effect, you see. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09, emphasis 
added) 
 
And the other reason is that in certain areas, there are some, there are elders 
of that area. Some didn’t like the xenophobic attacks, so they could just, it’s 
just, you said, they could just address people, stop the attacks, and some 
could start even campaigning, anti-xenophobic campaigns, and people could 
understand. But there are some places, even the elders they didn’t like the 
foreigners from long ago. So they could just take it as an advantage and let 
the people and say go and beat the foreigners. So places were different. It was only 
the difference of places. That’s why it was. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
It is notable that by blaming community leaders, the discourse manages to absolve the actual 
participants of guilt. As the first respondent says, the leaders “can give orders [such as] here 
we’re doing xenophobia or beating people”. Likewise, the second respondent says that in 
places where the “elders…didn’t like the foreigners from long ago”, the elders gave the 
order to their community to “go and beat the foreigners”. In this imagining, the power to 
decide whether to start the attacks was held entirely by community leaders.  
 
Other respondents blame the government and state-level politicians for inciting the 
xenophobic attacks. According to the following interviewees, the government is to blame for 
spreading the anti-migrant rhetoric that fueled the attacks. According to the second 
interviewee, after setting the stage with this xenophobic discourse, politicians then profited 
from attending rallies of unsatisfied South Africans and telling them, “we’re just going to off 
the foreigners and everybody will be employed”. 
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What I see is that the South African government is the – the other one which 
is causing the xenophobic. Because… [they] starts saying, you must – you 
must take your jobs from those foreigners because they take your jobs. So it 
makes – we must make something from them. So what I saw, instead of 
protecting us from violence, they are the one who is causing violence. 
(Interview, Anonymous, 29.09.09) 
 
Because some politicians, they thought they could gain some power with the 
majority of the people. Because employment, we were told that employment, 
there’s unemployment because there are more foreigners. So some politicians 
could come to at a rally and say, we’re going to just off the foreigners and 
everybody will be employed. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
You see, if everything happens, country-wide, national-wise, it means there’s somebody 
who is benefiting from it and there’s a leader. And some events like the xenophobia, 
they can’t be leaded by someone just general – it’s obvious, there’s an 
obvious case that a government official or somebody, about the army, the 
people, what-what-what, who were involved and they, they can’t just keep on 
with something – someone is not benefiting them. That is why it was, you 
know, happening on and on and on. They could benefit from it because they 
can’t participate in something which have no benefit. But we couldn’t 
specifically know what they benefited, or money or what. But they benefited. 
(Interjection from P2) Some of them, they even benefited political power. 
Because people would like them, saying chasing foreigners, there’s a lot of 
jobs, what-what-what. So they benefited in a lot of ways. (Interview, 
Anonymous, 02.11.09, emphasis added) 
 
Again, this discourse allows the political community member to be absolved of most of the 
guilt: while the participants admit that they believed the xenophobic rhetoric, the 
government is blamed for spreading and profiting from it. 
 
The idea that those who incited the attacks had something to gain from them is widespread. 
The following respondents blame criminals, or tsotsis, for starting and continuing the 
attacks. Criminals were seen to benefit from the chaos, which provided a cover for them to 
continue stealing and looting property. As the first respondent argues, the attacks were not 
started because of competition over resources or employment; they were started by tsotsis 
taking advantage of the anti-foreigner sentiment.  
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You know, you check that xenophobia, it started because of – foreigners, 
they wanted to work for less money. The tsotsis, the tsotsis guys from South 
Africa, it’s like we’re taking advantage, some of us it’s like we’re taking 
advantage, as in we’re going there and beating people and burning their 
houses. So at the end, you could check and it’s not about employment. Some of 
the guys were busy searching and robbing, you get the sense. The tsotsis, you 
can find a tsotsi from the rank, from the taxi rank there, you can see that side 
they were beating up people, the Zimbabweans there. The tsotsis, we will run 
away, will run from the taxi rank and they will rob people instead of chasing 
those people [foreigners] away. [The tsotsis think,] “We will rob them, we 
will search them, we will burn them, we’ll kill them”. So everywhere [that] there’s 
war, I think there is someone who will be taking advantage. (Interview, Anonymous, 
02.11.09, emphasis added) 
 
And the reason why people could keep on, some people they got rich with 
the xenophobic attacks. That’s why they kept on attacking. […] Some people, 
they benefited from the attacks. […] Robbers, even some officials, high 
officials, they could benefit. But especially the robbers. Because even in the 
shops, Indian shops, they could get and attack and take everything. So that’s 
the reason they kept on doing. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
So I think it’s, this town is tsotsis, you see. It’s all about people who want to 
steal from others. You see. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
You will come and attack me, but me I can go to police and say oh no, these 
people, they were not doing anything about xenophobia but they were searching my 
pockets, they wanted to take things from me. Then the government can easily realise 
that it’s not about xenophobia, it’s people taking advantage. You see. 
(Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09, emphasis added) 
 
Like those who blame the community leaders or politicians, those who blame criminals for 
the xenophobic attacks succeed in defining the political community’s morality through 
excluding others. After all, if the countrywide violence was incited by criminals, then the 
political community member is defined as even more moral in comparison. 
 
In addition to community leaders, state politicians and criminals, the re-imagined history of 
the xenophobic attacks blames the police. The following respondent suggests that the cops, 
criminals and community leaders are in cahoots with each other. The police officers have 
inside knowledge that helps criminals, such as when large sums are being transported 
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between banks. As the interviewee below notes, “they will be having all the chiefs” – 
meaning that the community leaders have also signed off on this conspiracy. 
Most of the time when you hear, when you see, or when you read 
newspapers or see or watch on the TVs, of this thing of being robbed in the 
bank, you will see that there are also cops who are involved in this criminal 
thing of being robbed the bank. You see them saying Sergeant whatever, 
Sergeant who, was also involved in this thing. So they will be keeping tips, 
saying no, during this time they will be closing the bank, or during this time 
the money of the Standard Bank will be going or the, what you call it, that 
car, the van which carries money, will be coming to fetch money at this time. 
Sergeant, or something like that. And they will be having all the chiefs. So it’s 
easy for them to just come and rob, you know, because most cops will be 
around there and when these activities are happening, they won’t do 
anything. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
While this three-tiered conspiracy may seem far-fetched, its dubious reliability adds to the 
rest of the exclusionary discourse, which altogether reveals just how much the political 
community values morals – or, at least, appears to value morals. The community is so 
concerned with morality that it has willingly cast not only criminals as immoral, but the 
country’s leaders and police force as well, and excluded them from membership in the 
political community. 
 
A CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY: THE MIGRANT PERSPECTIVE 
Even migrants, who were violently excluded in 2008, have noticed this change in political 
community. This is interesting because it demonstrates that the effects of the changed 
political community have expanded beyond the collective memory of the South African 
community. Consider the following quotes, which all emphasise a change between “before” 
and “nowadays”. 
Nowadays, the employers they are very afraid – they realise that they – if they 
don’t pay, really they are taken to the laws. (Interview, Anonymous, 29.09.09, 
emphasis added) 
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I don’t see any problem about their policies because they are making us 
flexible right now. Previously we are afraid that if the police catch you they are 
going to deport you and we also didn’t have money to put visas so that we 
can come here. But right now everything is flexible. If the police catch you they 
just let you have an asylum so that you can stay and we are no longer putting 
visas. So I think it’s excellent on our side. (Interview, Anonymous, 01.10.09, 
emphasis added) 
 
The policies they’ve put in place at the moment, I can say that it is positive 
because people are coming in and flocking the country day by day. And you 
see they […] [are] giving people asylum for identification purposes. So that 
one means that they’re encouraging foreigners and they’re ready to help 
them. Because the people come from different countries with different 
reasons, basing on their country – how the condition and the political 
stability of the country is. So there are people who are – I can say South 
Africans, they’ve changed their attitude from the previous year. Yeah. (Interview, 
Anonymous, 30.09.09, emphasis added) 
 
They [police] will arrest him [criminal] – they will arrest him and maybe after 
two to three hours or one day, you will see that person back but people rise 
to – some points, and as for this past six months you see there is a change, 
because now there are some – they are – the police they are working with 
some other people in this community. They are training some – some people 
to – to solve crimes in this place. So it have changed. (Interview, Anonymous, 
29.09.09, emphasis added) 
 
Nowadays there are changes there, the police and the – this community have – 
come together so they can work towards one goal. Because a crime at this 
church is a crime to the country, so they – they have seen that what they were doing 
before is not right. (Interview, Anonymous, 29.09.09, emphasis added) 
 
The purpose of this series of quotes is to capture the change that Zimbabwean migrants 
have experienced, from before the xenophobic attacks to after the attacks. The changes have 
affected various areas of everyday life, from getting paid regularly to experiencing a more 
rapid police response to crime, to more lenient immigration policies. The fact that migrants, 
who were targeted during the attacks, have felt the change described by the emerging 
discourse around the attacks, reveals that the discourse has had real-world implications. 
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CONCLUSION 
There are several key findings to take away from this chapter’s discussion. First, the South 
African political community that supported and engaged in the 2008 xenophobic attacks 
used language ability as a test to identify non-members. This suggests that the community 
understood itself primarily though sharing a common language. It also understood 
membership as entitlement to a finite amount of resources, which were being usurped by 
outsiders who have access to their own resources. Second, the political community’s shared 
values and understanding of membership changed between the months after the xenophobic 
attacks, when much of the existing qualitative and quantitative research that I relied on was 
collected, and one and a half years after the attacks, which is when I did my own research. 
The emerging discourse about the xenophobic attacks and the political community imagines 
members to be moral and mature, assuming collective guilt for the attacks but fundamentally 
changed. Because members accepted a collective responsibility for the attacks, it appears that 
the makeup of the political community still includes the 2008 supporters of xenophobic 
discourse and perpetrators of xenophobic violence, but it does not rule out the membership 
of people who did not support xenophobic sentiments. Finally, the new discourse about the 
political community exercises its right to self-determination by aggressively engaging in an 
exclusionary discourse against criminals, police, politicians and community leaders who are 
actively blamed for starting the xenophobic rhetoric and violence.  
 
While these findings have given us a surprising insight into the values that the political 
community in question share, as well as how they understand their community, the drastic 
change in shared values begs the question: what caused this change, and is it sustainable? 
The final chapter will consider this question, looking at the political gain that comes with re-
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imagining history and, in particular, the outside influence of the 2010 FIFA World Cup and 
the authority of the international community. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Political Community and the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It would be easy to attribute South Africa’s collective assumption of guilt and expression of 
morality and repentance as a natural reaction to a horrific moment in the country’s history. 
However, the causes of the 2008 xenophobic violence remain. Unemployment stands at 
24% (see www.statssa.gov.za), guaranteed rights are no closer to becoming experienced 
rights for the underprivileged and isolated incidents of violence against migrants continue. In 
the conclusion to this dissertation, I will examine the change in the political community’s 
shared values and new acts of exclusion in light of the upcoming 2010 FIFA World Cup. 
 
CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE THROUGH RE-IMAGINING THE PAST 
Re-imagining the past, as South Africans have done, often has calculated implications for 
both the present and the future. Harootunian (2000) argues that the interpretation of the 
past has become a point of contention, since it has serious implications for the value of the 
present. He posits that, “History, if this term has any sense, is the history of the present and 
is thus necessarily politicized” (734). For example, McCormack (2001) argues that historical 
revisionists in Japan are reconstructing their past, which is clouded by war crimes against 
China and Korea, in order to influence the future trajectory of the nation. This finding 
resonates with Appadurai (1996), who suggests that re-imagining the past is a compelling, 
collective activity that also mobilises for the future: “historical narratives of a people’s past 
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are retrospective only in form but are future-directed in all their meaningful implications” 
(224).  
 
It is not only group members who benefit from re-imagining history, but outside actors as 
well. Malkki (1996) and Turner (2005) both observe that international humanitarian 
organisations “universalize” refugees and strip them of their particular histories, in an effort 
to silence them and maintain the organisations’ neutral positions. In describing the outcome 
of “dehistoricizing” refugees, Malkki (1996) highlights the power and political nature of 
history: 
This dehistoricizing universalism creates a context in which it is difficult for 
people in the refugee category to be approached as historical actors rather 
than simply as mute victims. It can strip from them the authority to give 
credible narrative evidence or testimony about their own condition in 
politically and institutionally consequential forums.” (378) 
 
In the case of Burundian refugees in a UNHCR camp in Tanzania, stripping refugees of 
their historical identities leaves them “mute victims” with neither “authority” nor 
“consequence”. In Arendtian terms, “dehistoricizing” refugees is akin to depriving them of 
their rights, as both processes leave them with meaningless actions and opinions. These 
examples demonstrate that there is frequently a direct relationship between historical 
revisions and future politics, and that both internal and external groups can be beneficiaries 
of either re-imagining or silencing history. The question for us, then, is what would motivate 
the South African political community to reconstruct their shared memory of the 2008 
xenophobic violence.  
 
For anyone who has lived in South Africa in the past year or so, the first thought that comes 
to mind is the 2010 World Cup. Since FIFA announced that South Africa would be playing 
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host to the internationally prominent sporting event, the country has been struggling to 
prove that it is a “world class” destination. South Africa has pledged an infrastructure 
makeover: new bus systems, new train lines, new stadiums. However, protests by 
construction workers, a countrywide recession and resistance to the changes by all sectors of 
society have interrupted these goals. When the new Rea Vaya bus made its maiden voyage 
from Soweto into downtown Johannesburg five months ago, minibus taxi drivers fired at 
passengers and shot dead one of the officials who represented the minibus taxi sector in 
deals with the city. Likewise, wealthy residents in Saxonwold have protested the proposed 
bus route that would run through the suburb and decrease property values. Faced by 
extreme views that represent the extremes of inequality in South Africa, the Transportation 
Department has announced that the Soweto-Sandton bus route, which was supposed to be 
ready for the 11 June kickoff, will not be complete until next year. (Dugger 2010a) With the 
international community questioning whether it was an appropriate choice for host of the 
World Cup, it is inevitable that South Africa feels pressure to prove its worth.  
 
The idea that a local community would appeal to the larger international community for 
acceptance or recognition is not uncommon. Among marginalised South Africans, Cape 
Town has long been considered an effective site for international lobbying, since it is an 
international tourist destination. Amisi & Ballard (2005) interviewed a Congolese network 
elder who explained that even if demonstrations in Cape Town had no immediate impact, 
they were important because they bring international attention to the situation. Other 
interviewees noted the power of tourist sites and the leverage that a problem in a tourist area 
can impose on a host country. Likewise, Turner (2004) demonstrates that Burundian 
refugees in Tanzania, who fear that the rest of the world has forgotten them, seek 
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recognition from the international community rather than the Tanzanian state, due to a 
belief in the omnipotence and unquestioned power of the “big nations”.  
 
It is not only local communities who stand to benefit by appealing to the international 
community. Jacobsen (2002) argues that host states always benefit from the political 
leverage, media coverage, international aid packages and other resources that accompany 
refugees. Similarly, Turner (2005) shows that the Tanzanian government has created a 
discourse whereby refugees and international aid – rather than the government’s failed 
policies – are to blame for its weak economy. Bennett (2002), on the other hand, argues that 
the international community has no power over states in terms of refugees and migrants. 
While this argument makes the belief in the power of the international community seem 
naïve, it supports the notion that states benefit – either materially or psychologically – from 
appealing to the international community. Even if the international has no real power over 
states, it has access to material resources that states do not. In other words, all levels of 
South African society have something to gain by re-imagining the xenophobic attacks and 
constructing themselves as moral, mature, world-class citizens.  
 
Interviews with South African citizens invariably touched on the importance of the World 
Cup and its effect on the country’s reaction to the 2008 xenophobic attacks. South Africans 
interviewed unanimously believed that the international community provides some sort of 
protection to migrants – whether direct or peripheral – since South Africa is in the 
international spotlight until July 2010. As the following respondents explain, the fact that the 
country had been picked to host the World Cup indicated that its “status” in the 
international community was finally on the rise. But the xenophobic attacks threatened to 
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derail this rising international status, as international travelers and tourists might be “afraid 
of [for] his life” and cancel their trips to South Africa for the World Cup. 
…now, we are seeing 2-10 World Cup coming to South Africa, which is 
good, the nation’s status is going up, but the issue of xenophobia, they 
almost embarrassed the country. I think they have to look at it so that, we 
must forget about that one. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09)  
 
Yeah, and about the world, it’s obvious that the world could hate [to] even 
come here for the World Cup or even for business because xenophobia, it’s 
something which is very dangerous. So somebody who wanted to come for 
the 2010, something like America, England, Russia, he could just cancel the 
journey because he’s afraid of his life. So the world, it didn’t like it. Yeah. 
(Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
As the first respondent states, “we must forget about that one”. This vagueness is intriguing; 
it indicates that either South Africans must forget about what happened and re-imagine the 
past, or they must forget about their xenophobic sentiment to avoid another outbreak in the 
future. Either way, the reason this respondent says xenophobic attacks must be stopped is 
not because of morals or shared humanity, but because South Africans have to consider 
what the violence is doing to the country’s reputation in the international community.  
 
Other respondents suggest that if South Africa had not been in the international spotlight, 
the attacks would have lasted longer than they did. The following interviewee believes that 
the reason the attacks stopped is because FIFA and the international community had 
threatened to revoke South Africa’s hosting privileges and instate Egypt or Russia as the 
host, or to simply “cancel” the World Cup altogether. 
And also the thing of World Cup, since we are hosting 2010. So they [the 
attackers and their supporters] saw that no, if it’s going to continue, this thing 
of xenophobia, the World Cup, there was already talk, they had already been 
talking of saying they have to host, they have to, I mean, to cancel the World 
Cup, it was supposed to be hosting in something like in Egypt or Russia, I 
don’t remember. But it was supposed to be canceled so they stopped it immediately, 
immediately effect. So what I can say is, the government people, they were 
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also inside, I mean they were also being jealous of foreigners. (Interview, 
Anonymous, 02.11.09)  
 
By linking threats from the international community with the “immediate” end of the 
xenophobic attacks, this respondent suggests that the government had a direct role in 
orchestrating the attacks. As he says, the “government people…they were also being jealous 
of foreigners” – in other words, the government had just as much xenophobic sentiment as 
the perpetrators of the attacks.  
 
Several respondents stated that xenophobic attacks would start again once the World Cup 
had been successfully hosted and the international tourists had gone home. The following 
quote is quite long, but it describes how people in minibus taxis and on the streets are 
“whispering” to each other to contain their xenophobic anger until after the World Cup.  
One more thing which I can add is that, what I can say or what I just think 
of, what I just said, when some other people were talking, I heard people 
chatting, saying, “let’s just wait for 2010. When this 2010 gets finished, we are 
going to attack also foreigners as well. They must go back to their home countries.” 
So it’s like they are just waiting for 2010 to get finished. They are afraid of 
attacking foreigners right now. Because they know that if they attack foreigners, the 
people who will attack foreigners, they are going to be behind bars and 2010 is going to be 
canceled totally. So they are afraid of committing this crime of xenophobia 
thing again, you see. I think it’s going to happen again after 2010, that’s what 
I think. […] What I think, it’s going to happen again after 2010. So what I 
can say is, they have to be strict here. When 2010 just gets finished, they have 
to have, I mean, they have to do something about this thing. Because I know 
that, I think it’s going to happen. Because most people, in the taxis or even 
just walking on the street, you just hear them chatting, whispering, saying, 
when just 2010 passes, even when you hear a foreigner speaking their home languages, 
you become angry, you become, you feel like, I don’t know. So they just say, 
these people they are, you know, they are humiliating us, it’s like they say 
disgusting things, you know, in our streets, these people, they are making us 
lose our jobs. So when just 2010 just gets finished, we are going to attack 
them. That’s what I heard. (Interview, Anonymous, 02.11.09) 
 
As the respondent says, attackers know that as long as South Africa is in the international 
spotlight, anyone who commits a violent xenophobic act will “be behind bars” and the 
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country will be punished because “2010 is going to be canceled totally”. The idea that people 
are whispering on the streets and in the back of taxis evokes the image of a larger conspiracy 
at work, and undercuts the sincerity of the remorse voiced by South Africans. The 
respondent points out that, “even when you hear a foreigner speaking their home languages, 
you become angry” – which is the sentiment that sparked the 2008 attacks. In other words, it 
is quite possible that the political community’s shared values and policies of admission have 
not changed, but have simply been masked for a short period.  
 
The same South African respondents who had described their collective guilt, remorse and 
newfound morality about the 2008 xenophobic violence explained that xenophobic attacks 
would return once the 2010 FIFA World Cup was over and the country was out of the 
international spotlight. These two sentiments are clearly at odds with each other. However, 
they are not at odds with the idea of a political community. While I have been most 
interested in and influenced by Hannah Arendt’s conception of a political community 
throughout this research process, it appears that Michael Walzer’s concept – that political 
communities and membership in them are affected by “the actual contacts, connections, 
alliances we have established [with outsiders] and the effects we have had beyond our 
borders” (1983: 32) – might be the most relevant in today’s context. That is, the most 
significant aspect of a political community today is not so much the protection of shared 
values that elicit exclusionary action, but the practice of universally accepted values that offer 
the opportunity for inclusion.  
 
We can take away two main points from this conclusion. First, a political community’s 
shared values will change, based on its changing relationship with outside actors and events. 
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This chapter’s discussion has highlighted the way that the political community that 
contributed to the xenophobic attacks has dramatically altered its position on violence and 
migrants in light of the 2010 World Cup. Second, members of a political community will 
change as its shared values change. This means that such communities can change, overlap 
and even disappear. As established in the first chapter, the political community that 
supported and engaged in the 2008 xenophobic attacks is but one political community in 
South Africa. Not all South Africans belonged, and it was by no means the only political 
community that existed in South Africa at the time.   
 
In light of the above, this Masters dissertation has made three main contributions to the 
literature surrounding Arendt’s “right to have rights” and the current approaches to studying 
the 2008 xenophobic attacks in South Africa. First, it demonstrates that the shared values 
that determine the “right to have rights” change, and it specifically uses the context of the 
2008 xenophobic violence to do so. Second, it implicitly – though unintentionally – 
strengthens the argument that legal status may be the best indicator of the “right to have 
rights”, as it is a more easily measured and less easily contested symbol of membership. 
Finally, this Masters dissertation has contributed a snapshot of the opinions and actions of 
vulnerable South Africans and Zimbabwean migrants at a very sensitive and nascent period 
of transition – following the country’s most public outburst of violence since apartheid, and 
preceding the country’s most public display of national pride and international 
accomplishment since the dismantling of apartheid. At the time of this writing, the World 
Cup is fast approaching and South Africa is determined to have more of a national presence 
at the FIFA-organized competition, which is increasingly dominated by Shakira, who wrote 
the official anthem, and McDonalds, which is the official restaurant (Dugger 2010b). As the 
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country wraps up a campaign to impress the international community, which ranges from 
inserting more South African talent into the World Cup entertainment lineup to completely 
redefining the national discourse that surrounds the 2008 xenophobic attacks, a snapshot of 
the transformation from May 2008 to June 2010 is even more valuable.  
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